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The Social Impact of COVID-19 in the United States: A Three-Wave Longitudinal Study

Xiaogang Wu, PhD
Yufeng Global Professor of Social Science and Director,
Center for Applied Social and Economic Research (CASER),
NYU Shanghai
(email: xw29@nyu.edu)

Xi Li, PhD
Post-doctoral Fellow of Social Science
Center for Applied Social and Economic Research (CASER)
NYU Shanghai
(email: xl4749@nyu.edu)

Jia Miao, PhD
Assistant Professor of Sociology
Center for Applied Social and Economic Research (CASER)
NYU Shanghai
(Email: jm9040@nyu.edu)

Jun Yin, PhD
Post-doctoral Fellow of Social Science
Center for Applied Social and Economic Research (CASER)
NYU Shanghai
(Email: jy4759@nyu.edu)

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About NYU SHANGHAI

NYU Shanghai is the third degree-granting campus in NYU’s global network, joining NYU in New York and NYU Abu Dhabi. It aims to become a world-class, comprehensive liberal arts and sciences research university in the heart of Shanghai, and unlike any other university in the world.

Since 1831, NYU has proudly been in and of the city of New York, unencumbered by gates, intimately woven into the identity and landscape of one of the great idea capitals of the world. In the heart of Greenwich Village, the NYU community has flourished, gaining as much from the city as it has contributed.

Just as NYU is proudly in and of the city of New York, NYU is also proudly in and of the city of Shanghai, another great idea capital and a magnet for the best of intellect, culture, and inquiry from all over the world. But Shanghai is like no other place: a city of the future, it also has its own history and traditions, which are a vital part of its fabric. With its diverse resources—the educational foundation of NYU and the vibrancy and relevance of Shanghai—NYU Shanghai is where your classroom education intersects with a life’s education.

About CASER

The Center for Applied Social and Economic Research (CASER) at NYU Shanghai is dedicated to fostering methodologically rigorous, multi-disciplinary research on the most pressing issues related to China’s socioeconomic development. CASER convenes scholars from multiple disciplines to conduct research based on quantitative analysis in focus areas such as education, family and gender, inequality and poverty, migration, population aging and health, as well as urban neighborhood and governance issues.
About LECC-US

“Life Experience and Community during COVID-19 in the US” (LECC-US) is a panel survey of nationally representative sample of American adults (aged 18 or above) on their health and infection, mental health and subjective wellbeing, social attitudes, and life experience, and political participation during and after the pandemic at three points in the period, beginning in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic. In Sept 2020, 4,407 people participated, in March 2021, 3,439 agreed to be re-interviewed, and in July 2023, 3,001 people completed a third interview. In this report, we present the main results from the recently completed Wave-3 survey, along with the results from Wave-1 and Wave-2 surveys, to describe the update conditions and changing dynamics of American society through the pandemic era. Because the Covid-19 had become a catalyst of the exacerbating the US-China relations, a particular theme of interest in the LECC-US project is American’s attitude towards China, and how it was shaped by domestic politics and international events, as well as the public attitude towards Chinese American as a result of the geopolitical tension between these two countries. LECC-US is the first joint data-collection project between NYU Shanghai and NYU Washington Square. Study participants were part of the probability-based AmeriSpeak® Panel compiled by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago.

Contact information

CASER

Email: shanghai.caser@nyu.edu

Address: Room N838, 567 West Yangsi Road, Pudong New Area, Shanghai, China
Executive Summary

Background

The COVID-19 pandemic, caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV), has profoundly impacted every facet of American society. The first American COVID-19 deaths occurred in February 2020, leading to an allocation of $8.3 billion by former President Trump on March 6th, 2020, to combat the outbreak. A national emergency was declared on March 13th, and by mid-April 2020, all states and territories had declared disasters. Subsequent waves of infections in June, October, and March 2021, alongside variants like Alpha and Delta, further intensified safety measures. The Omicron variant in January 2022 resulted in record-high hospitalizations and cases, with approximately 77.5% of Americans contracting COVID-19 by the end of 2022. The United States has witnessed the highest death toll globally, with 103,802,702 confirmed cases and 1,123,836 total deaths as of March 10th, 2023.

The rapid and extensive spread of the pandemic, as well as the attempts to slow the spread, has brought profound changes in economic and social life across the United States, impacting American’ health and mental health, work and employment, family and social life, and attitudes and behaviors. In April 2020, the unemployment rate soared to 14.7%, remaining at 6.7% in November. Many shifted to remote work as workplaces closed, while school closures burdened working parents with childcare needs. Physical and mental health challenges increased, fueled by uncertainties surrounding the public health crisis. The ramifications of the pandemic were further complicated by domestic political polarization, the divisive transfer of power from Donald Trump to Joe Biden, and geopolitical rivalry (with China), calling for a comprehensive understanding of social and political dynamics during and after the pandemic.
Objectives

The LECC-US project, jointly launched by the Center for Applied Social and Economic Research (CASER) at NYU Shanghai and the Center for Advanced Social Science Research (CASSR) at New York University, aims to track the social and political ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. To ensure comprehensive coverage of the national population, the LECC-US employed the AmeriSpeak® Panel, a probability-based sample designed by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago. This panel includes a diverse population of U.S. adults aged 18 or above and aligns closely with national demographics based on the Current Population Survey (CPS).

The LECC-US offers unique up-to-date micro-level survey data with a national probability sample, covering three waves spanning the period before and after the 2020 Presidential Election, and the post-pandemic era. Unlike many existing data sources, the survey links the pandemic not only to people’s attitude toward the COVID 19 and preventive behaviors, but also broadly to mental health, political trusts, social attitudes, and public opinion on China, thus providing an important source of information to gauge the social and political ramifications of the pandemic in the United States.

This report analyzes three waves of panel survey data on nationally representative samples and presents evidence to delineate the multifaceted repercussions of the pandemic on Americans’ evolving work and family life, community and social interaction, and social attitudes and public sentiment. Analyses are finely stratified by various social groups, such as gender, race/ethnicity, age, and education. We also pay special attention to party identification given the increasing political divide in the country. The report underscores the intricate relationship between the pandemic and individuals’ social attitudes and behaviors so as to provide
compelling insights into the changing social landscapes throughout the pandemic in the United States.

**Methodology**

The LECC-US project, a panel survey, aims to comprehensively assess social and political impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. Administered by the NORC on behalf of NYU Shanghai and NYU, this research project used the NORC’s AmeriSpeak Panel as the primary sample source. The large-size and nationally representative sample allowed for focused further analyses by different social groups. The survey was conducted in both English and Spanish, using web-based and telephone survey methods to ensure inclusivity and accessibility.

A diverse cross-section of U.S. adults aged 18 and above was selected from the NORC’s AmeriSpeak Panel. To create a representative sample, sophisticated sampling strata were employed based on key demographic variables, including age, race/ethnicity, education, and gender, resulting in 48 sampling strata. Sample sizes for each stratum were determined to align with the population distribution of each stratum. The sample was geographically distributed across the U.S., ensuring representation of regions. The sample selection process considered expected variation in survey completion rates among different demographic subgroups.

The LECC-US project involved three waves of data collection, using web-based surveys and telephone interviews. The first wave, conducted between October 8th and October 27th, 2020, included 4,407 adults aged 18 or above. The second wave, conducted between March 23rd to April 5th, 2021, with 3,439 respondents from the first wave being successfully followed, resulting in a 78.03% retention rate. The third wave, from June 30th to July 24th, 2023, included 3,001 respondents, with 2,659 being tracked successfully across all three waves.
Statistical weights for eligible respondents underwent a multi-stage process to ensure data accuracy and representativeness. Base sampling weights were calculated based on the probability of selection from the NORC National Frame, adjusted for subsampling rates. Household-level nonresponse-adjusted weights were post-stratified to match external population counts obtained from the Current Population Survey (CPS). Individual-level nonresponse adjustments were applied within households. Panel weights were further refined through raking to external population totals across various socio-demographic characteristics, sourced from the CPS. Study-specific base sampling weights combined with the selection probabilities resulted in study-specific weights. These weights were adjusted for nonresponse and trimmed to minimize error in survey estimates. The final weights were raked to match respondent demographics with the target population’s characteristics. In the third wave, three weight components—AmeriSpeak Panel Weights, Study Specific Base Weights, and Study Specific Final Weights—were combined to ensure representativeness and accuracy of the data.

Key Findings
In the report, we first conduct a comprehensive overview of the evolving landscapes of the COVID-19 pandemic, and then analyze its impacts on Americans’ work and family life, their perception of community, mental health and subjective evaluation, trusts in governments, and nationalist sentiment, followed by a more focused and in-depth analysis of the changing public opinion on China and Chinese Americans.

First, the COVID-19 infection spread quickly in the United States over the three years from 2020 to 2023, followed by the increase in vaccination rates. While only 11.6% reported that they were tested positively in 2020 (Wave 1), the percentage rose to 18.6% in 2021.
By the time of interview in Wave 3 in 2023, 56.8% of our sample reported that they had been infected by the COVID-19 or the variant virus. Among those who were infected, about one-third (32.4%) were infected more than once. In the survey sample, 80% have been vaccinated for at least one shot as of 2023, compared to 41.2% vaccination rate in Spring 2021 (Wave 2). Both infections and vaccinations differ by different social groups, such as gender, race/ethnicity, age groups, and education, and party identification.

- Females showed a slightly higher infection rate (58.3%) than males (55.5%), and higher non-vaccination rates (25.3%) than males (19.4%).
- Hispanic and White Americans had highest infection rates (61.4% and 58.6%), despite the fact that they also had higher rates of vaccinations (81.5% and 76.9%).
- Americans aged at 60 or above had the lowest rates of infections, because they were more conscientious of the health risk and thus more likely to adopt preventive behaviors.
- Individuals with a college education or more reported the highest infection and vaccination rates.
- Republicans had higher infection rates compared to Independents and Democrats, and Democrats led in vaccination rates over Republicans. Partisanship played an evident important role in shaping vaccination decision and thus, the infection outcomes.

Second, economic and social lives have been back to normal, despite the fact that some changes such as remote work brought by the pandemic may continue. Job loss and workplace closure consistently declined as the pandemic faded away, and people gained confidence in their job security. Among those who are employed, the proportion of working at home remain stable across waves (over 20%) and remote work seems to have become a new
normal, though parents engaged in teaching children at home gradually declined as schools re-opened. Work income of surveyed respondents declined initially during the pandemic in 2020 but then increased in 2022, by 18.7% compared to 2019. Overall, Americans are more optimistic about their future life five years from 2023, and 44.6% rank that their life would be “better” or “much better.”

Other subgroup variations are also worth noting.

- Remote work rates were higher among younger workers aged between 18-29 and 30-44 (26.9% and 27.2%, respectively), and among those with college education and those with graduate and professional degrees (36.6% and 46.1%, respectively). These patterns may be associated with the industries and occupations they are engaged in.

- Young people and people with low education, female, and non-whites, continue to feel less job security that their counterparts over the course of the pandemic. The percentage who fear that they may lose the job or be laid off among these vulnerable groups have declined, but more slowly than other groups as the pandemic faded away.

- Work income increased unequally among different social groups. Middle-aged workers (30-44 and 45-59) experienced higher income growth; those with college and graduate education also experience higher income growth compared to 2019, suggesting that income inequality has become worse off in 2023 compared to the pre-pandemic era.

- Optimistic assessment in future life (five years from now) is negatively associated with age but positively associated with education. Notably, Whites Americans are much less optimistic about their future life than other racial/ethnic minority groups.
As to party identification, Democrats are more optimistic about their future than Republicans.

Third, the COVID-19 pandemic had yielded tremendous mental health cost on American adults and far-reaching consequences of their social experience. Respondents’ mental distress, measured by the Hopkins Symptom Checklist (HSCL-5), showed a sign of improvement over time as the pandemic gradually retreated, and their feelings of isolation (measured with two items) had been relieved across waves. Loneliness (measured with UCLA loneliness scale), nevertheless, remained stable from 2021 to 2023. The abrupt lockdowns, constant remote work, social distancing, and fear of infection during the COVID-19 had profound transformed people’s social experience and damaged their social relations. The social resilience varies by different social groups.

- Hispanics and other race/ethnic groups consistently reported high level of mental distress, isolation and loneliness across waves, while Whites reported the lowest levels.
- Age is negatively associated with mental distress, isolation, and loneliness across waves. Old people tend to experience lower level of mental distress, feeling of isolation, and perception of loneliness than young people.
- Republicans consistently reported the lowest levels of mental distress, feeling of isolation, and perception of loneliness than Democrats and Independents.
- The improvement of mental health does not seem to be differentiated by gender, race/ethnicity, age, and education.

Fourth, neighborhood communities had played important roles in fighting the COVID-19 and remained largely stable and revived after the pandemic. Despite the constant
lockdown, stay-home orders and social distancing rules, community collective efficacy, including both social cohesion and informal social control, experienced a minor decline during the COVID-19 but bounced back to the level prior to the pandemic in 2023, suggesting adaptability and resilience of American communities in response to the changing circumstances throughout the pandemic. The majority of American maintained their high trust in their neighbors, which remained stable throughout the survey. Linking the Zip code of respondents’ address to the neighborhood characteristics, our further analysis shows that the following pattern that may help to understand the spatial differentiation of the COVID-19 infections.

- Communities with predominantly White population consistently reported higher levels of collective efficacy.

- Communities with population of higher median household incomes, lower poverty rates, higher education and younger age, and lower densities tended to report higher community collective efficacy.

- At individual level, education appeared to be positively associated with neighborhood trust, and those with higher education tended to express higher trust in their neighbors. Whites also reported highest trust in their neighbors. These results underpinned the association between community demographic characteristics and collective efficacy.

- In addition, Republicans show higher trust in their neighbors than Independents and Democrats.

**Fifth, there was a notable shift in American’s preferences between pandemic prevention and personal privacy and freedom, and a decline in trust in governments.** Americans are increasingly lean toward the personal privacy and freedom from 2021 to 2023, as
the pandemic became less threatening. In contrast to their high and stable neighborhood trusts, American’s trust in both state and federal governments showed a consistent decline across the waves, and they were even more distrustful in the federal government than in the state government. Nevertheless, Americans’ nationalist sentiment remained strong and slightly increased. Containing and slowing the initial spread of the COVID-19 virus required government’s coordination and enforcement of regulations and citizens’ cooperation, which had been undermined by bipartisan politics and fierce competition in the Presidential Election in 2020, leading to the largest toll of the pandemic in the world. Regarding the public opinion on prevention policy choice and political trust, there was a clear bipartisan divide.

- Democrats generally favored pandemic prevention measures, while Republicans leaned towards prioritizing personal freedom and privacy.
- Democrats expressed greater trust in both state and federal governments compared to others (i.e., Republicans and Independents).
- The decline in political trusts over the pandemic were more pronounced among Democrats than among Republicans and Independents.
- White and Republicans reported increasingly strong nationalist sentiment (i.e., “being proud” or “being very proud” of being American).

Finally, Americans’ attitude towards China have become even more negative over three waves of surveys, reaching a historical low in 2023. Those who held “somewhat unfavorable”, and “very unfavorable” views of China increased from 73.17% in 2020 to 77.50% in 2023. Attitudes towards Chinese Americans are largely favorable (83.00% hold very favorable and somewhat favorable view). The trade war before the pandemic, the partisan politics within the United States, and China’s domestic and international policy changes
in neighboring regions, all contribute to shaping Americans’ public opinion on China, and to some extent, the evaluation of Chinese Americans.

- Americans’ attitudes towards China differed by their party identification. Those who identified themselves as Republicans held a more negative view of China, whereas those who identified themselves as Democrats held a less negative view of China.

- Despite the deeply divided domestic politics, Americans seemed to have reached a majority consensus on unfavorable view of China. Different people disliked China for different reasons.

- An experiment in Wave 2 revealed that China’s suppressive policy on Hong Kong (i.e., the implementation of the National Security Law in 2020) resulted in a significantly negative view of China. This was more pronounced among Democrats than among Republicans, and among participants who previously held a less unfavorable view of China.

- An experiment in Wave 3 revealed that China’s aggressive policy toward Taiwan and military exercise encircling the island in 2022 after Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan triggered a significant negative view of China. The treatment effect was more pronounced among Democrats than among Republicans. Economic nationalism behind the US-China trade war prior to the pandemic had also shaped the dynamics of public opinion more among Republicans.

- Chinese Americans were the victim of the tension of the US-China relationship and negative public perception of China. Although Chinese Americans were viewed favorably by and large, attitudes towards them were less favorable compared to Asian American in general or other subgroups of Asian Americans such as Korean Americans,
Filipino American. Regression results show that American’s negative attitudes towards China reduces their favorable view of Chinese Americans.

**Summary and Conclusion**

The extensive analysis of the three-wave panel data collected in 2020, 2021 and 2023 has painted the dynamic picture of American society throughout the pandemic. The COVID-19 was pervasive in the United States, affecting American’s employment, income, family and community, mental health, trust in government, nationalist sentiment, and attitudes towards Americans’ major rivalry, China.

With the end of the pandemic, economic and social lives have resumed to normal. Perception of job security, work income, confidence in the future life, mental distress and feeling of isolation, community collective efficacy, trust in neighbors, all showed signs of improvement, suggesting the strong resilience of American society. The improvement differed by gender, race/ethnicity, education, age group, and party identification. Understanding the critical need for vulnerable population call for targeted policies to mitigate disparities in social, economic and psychological outcomes in recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic.

One notable change throughout the pandemic was the consistent decline in Americans’ trust in both federal and state governments, and Americans were even more distrustful in the federal government than in the state government, despite the transition of presidency in the period. The government’s failure in tackling the COVID-19 crisis can be attributed to the bipartisan politics in the United States, further undermining their trust in government. As the pandemic retreated, Americans have increasingly prioritized personal privacy and freedom over the pandemic prevention and public safety. Such political trust was essential to gain citizens’
cooperation in dealing with the public health crisis in the future. Community resilience and trust-building initiatives are pivotal in navigating the post-pandemic landscape.

Last but not least, the COVID-19 crisis further escalating the tension in the US-China relationship. Although attitude towards China had turned negative during the trade war before the pandemic, a majority consensus on the view of China was formed despite the political divide in the United States, and Americans’ attitude towards China had become even more negative in the course of the pandemic, which also associated with their attitude towards 5.4 million Chinese American living in the United States. Survey experiments show that China’s aggressive behavior towards Taiwan and repressive policy in Hong Kong had helped to enhance the public perception on China, particularly for those who hold a less negative view of China. While public opinion rarely determines the U.S. foreign policy, it can define the zone within which policies with public visibility can be sustained over time. Chinese government may also be advised by the findings if it wishes to maintain and improve the relationship with the United States.

In conclusion, the COVID-19 pandemic has yielded profound and unfolding social and political ramifications in the United States and in global geopolitics, calling for more multi-disciplinary and sustainable research from comparative perspective to address social and economic challenges in the post-pandemic the world.
Chapter 1. Introduction

Background

The COVID-19 pandemic caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has had a significant impact on every aspect of U.S. society. As of March 10th, 2023, there have been 103,802,702 confirmed cases and 1,123,836 total deaths, making the United States the country with the highest death toll (Johns Hopkins University, 2023). This pandemic has ranked as the deadliest disaster in the history of the United States, resulting in significant harm to the nation’s life expectancy.

The first known American COVID-19 deaths occurred in February 2020. In response, former President Donald Trump allocated $8.3 billion on March 6th, 2020, to combat the outbreak and declared a national emergency on March 13th. By mid-April 2020, all states and territories had declared disasters as the number of COVID-19 cases continued to rise. A second wave of cases emerged in June of the same year, following the relaxation of restrictions in certain states, which pushed the number of newly diagnosed cases to more than 60,000 a day. In mid-October, a third surge of cases began, and in December 2020 and January 2021 new cases exceeded 200,000 on multiple days (U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2021).

In March 2021, a fourth wave of infections began with the rise of the Alpha variant, which was more transmissible and first identified in the United Kingdom. Subsequently, the Delta variant, an even more infectious mutation, which was first detected in India, led to increased safety measures. In January 2022, the Omicron variant, initially discovered in South Africa, emerged, resulting in record-high hospitalizations and cases. Notably, in the United States, 1.5 million new infections were reported on a single day. (Stieg, 2021). By the end of 2022, approximately 77.5% of Americans had contracted COVID-19 at least once (Vlachou,
Figure 1.1. Daily Confirmed COVID-19 Cases

Panel A. Worldwide

Panel B. United States

The rapid and extensive spread of the COVID-19 pandemic across the United States has ushered in profound and far-reaching changes in multiple aspects of people’s daily life, including health, employment, and parenting. A substantial portion of the American population fell victim to the disease, required hospitalization, and tragically lost their lives. Numerous households experienced significant financial adversity and are still feeling the effects. As a result, a notable portion of the population has been compelled to curtail both the quantity and quality of their food intake.

In April 2020, the unemployment rate skyrocketed to a historic pinnacle of 14.7%, remaining at an elevated 6.7% the following November, according to U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. For those fortunate enough to retain employment, many grappled with the shuttering of their workplaces, necessitating an abrupt transition to remote work arrangements. Moreover, the closure of schools and childcare centers magnified the burden on parents, who found themselves tasked with caring for and educating their children while continuing to fulfill their professional responsibilities. Consequently, many individuals experienced physical and mental health challenges, exacerbated by the lingering uncertainty surrounding the resolution of the public health crisis and the economic aftermath (Pfefferbaum & North, 2020; Robinson & Daly, 2020).

Furthermore, the pandemic profoundly influenced American perspectives on social and political issues (referred to “social attitudes” hereafter). Its far-reaching impact endures, echoing through various dimensions of American societal and political life, according to many studies (e.g., Ali et al. 2021; Harrison et al. 2021; Hassan & Mahmoud 2021; Groshen 2020; Johnston & Chen 2020; Wodon 2020). Concurrently, as the pandemic worsened, the country underwent a deeply divisive transfer of power from President Trump to President Joe Biden.
The COVID-19 pandemic has left an enduring imprint on the global economy, plunging numerous countries into a state of economic uncertainty and social instability. The severity of the pandemic’s impact within the United States has wrought profound changes in American social life. From surges in unemployment to the closure of schools and the transition to online learning, the swift and extensive reach of the pandemic has precipitated sweeping transformations. Population surveys further underscore the close association between the pandemic’s effects and individuals’ political affiliations, laying bare the profound sociopolitical chasm within American society.

As the United States endeavors to mitigate the adverse social and economic consequences of the pandemic, a plethora of research studies has emerged to deepen our comprehension of how COVID-19 has reverberated throughout the global community. These studies have examined a wide spectrum of themes, ranging from policy responses and governmental reactions to social consequences, economic outcomes, and health-related effects. Many institutions such as Pew Research, Gallup, the University of Chicago, and Northwestern University have contributed their own data sources to meticulously scrutinize the social impact of COVID-19 on Americans. Methodologies employed for data collection encompass survey experiments, interviews, and polling.
Figure 1.2. Unemployment Rate in the United States 2003-2023 (Seasonally Adjusted)


Objectives

The "Life Experience and Community During COVID-19 in the United States” (LECC-US) project was undertaken as a longitudinal study aimed at assessing the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on social life in the United States. This research initiative received joint sponsorship from the Center for Advanced Social Science Research (CASSR) at Faculty of Arts and Science (FAS) NYU Washington Square, led by Principal Investigator Mike Hout, and the Center for Applied Social and Economic Research (CASER) at NYU Shanghai, led by Principal Investigator Xiaogang Wu, and additional financial support was graciously provided by the NYU Faculty of Arts and Science and the NYU Shanghai Provost Office in New York.

To ensure a comprehensive representation of the United States, the LECC-US utilized the AmeriSpeak® Panel. This probability-based panel, meticulously designed by the NORC at the
University of Chicago, encompasses a demographically diverse population of U.S. adults aged 18 and older. The panel served as the primary data source for our survey. A benchmark analysis, comparing the demographics of respondents in our sample with demographics derived from the nationwide Current Population Survey (CPS), reveals a close alignment between our sample and the broader population.

To the best of our knowledge, the LECC-US survey provides the first up-to-date micro-level social survey data with a national probability sample. The data possess remarkable uniqueness in two notable aspects. While numerous existing data sources derive from longitudinal studies, the LECC-US project provides a distinctive timeline encompassing three waves that span both before and after the 2020 U.S. presidential election. Furthermore, the survey features inquiries probing the pandemic’s impact on domestic political trust, attitudes, and its influence on sentiments concerning China, where the COVID-19 outbreak began. In contrast to many other existing data sources, the LECC-US study not only addresses changes in behavior and attitudes related to critical factors, such as mental health, family dynamics, and employment, but also delves into the social and political impact of the pandemic.\(^1\)

This report comprehensively chronicles the evolving demographic patterns of social life and prevailing attitudes within the United States throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. Drawing upon a rich dataset comprising three meticulously conducted waves of the most up-to-date micro-level panel data, it employs rigorous empirical analysis to illuminate the multifaceted

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\(^1\) For example, the 49-wave Axios-Ipsos Coronavirus Index, which was initiated in March 2020 and continues to the present day, features a sample size of 1,000 (see https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/129181/version/V1/view for details). However, the questionnaire focuses on American social behavior and attitudes during the pandemic, with only limited political inquiries and a notable absence of questions pertaining to China. Other data sources with a political focus often lack the longitudinal depth provided by our study or are confined to periods either preceding or following the election.
repercussions of the pandemic on the lives of individuals, families, and communities across the nation. The analyses are intricately stratified by various social determinants, encompassing gender, religion, race, birth cohort, educational attainment, political orientation, and regional distinctions. Significantly, the report highlights the complex relationship between the pandemic and individuals’ political perceptions, attitudes, and preferences. It offers compelling insights into the profound societal divide that arose in the United States due to these interconnected factors.

**Methodology**

The LECC-US project was designed as a panel survey with the primary objective of comprehensively evaluating the multifaceted impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the social fabric of the United States. The NORC, on behalf of NYU Shanghai and NYU Washington Square (Wave 1 and Wave 2) and NYU Shanghai (Wave 3), administered the LECC-US survey utilizing the NORC’s AmeriSpeak Panel as the primary sample source. This extensive research endeavor aimed to conduct a longitudinal investigation, tracking the evolving impact of the pandemic on social life within the United States. Moreover, the large sample size enables us to conduct focused subsample analyses, specifically targeting seniors, families with children, minority populations, and various other social groups. To ensure inclusivity and accessibility, the study was offered in both English and Spanish, utilizing web-based and telephone survey methods, facilitating broad participation and comprehensive data collection.

**Sampling**

A comprehensive cross-section of the U.S. adult population aged 18 and older was purposefully
chosen for inclusion in this study, drawn from NORC’s AmeriSpeak Panel. To ensure a truly representative sample, the selection process employed sophisticated sampling strata, strategically based on key demographic variables including age, race/ethnicity, level of education, and gender, amounting to a total of 48 sampling strata. The sample size allocated to each of these strata was meticulously determined in alignment with the population distribution of each stratum. As illustrated in the Figure 1.3, the sample exhibits a relatively even distribution across the United States, encompassing a wide range of geographical regions. This balanced distribution helps ensure that the sample is representative and can reflect the diversity and characteristics of various regions (NORC, 2020).

**Figure 1.3. Geographic Distribution of the Sample (Zip code) Across the United States (Wave 1)**

Moreover, the sample selection process carefully considered the expected variation in survey completion rates among demographic subgroups. Consequently, the resulting panel members who successfully completed interviews for this study emerged as an authentic and
representative sample of the intended target population. If a sampled household had multiple active adult members, a random within-household sampling approach was adopted, ensuring equitable selection. Furthermore, it is important to note that participants who had previously participated in an AmeriSpeak® study earlier within the same business week were not eligible for inclusion in another study until the following business week. In the third wave of this study, participants who had successfully completed either the first or second wave of the study were followed, further contributing to the longitudinal nature and continuity of the research design.

The LECC-US project encompassed three waves of data collection, conducted via web-based surveys and telephone interviews. The first wave was executed between October 8th and October 27th, 2020, engaging a nationally representative sample of 4,407 adults. The benchmark survey meticulously examined the impact of the pandemic on various aspects of respondents’ lives, including their work, family, community engagement, and general attitudes toward COVID-19 containment policies. The second wave was conducted from March 23rd to April 5th, 2021, with 3,439 respondents from the first wave participating in this follow-up phase, resulting in a 78.03% retention rate. For the third wave, the survey field period spanned from June 30th, 2023, to July 24th, 2023, during which 3,001 respondents successfully completed the survey. Notably, 2,659 of these respondents were tracked across all three waves, providing valuable insights into evolving trends and continuity over time. The following graph illustrates the composition of the longitudinal sample, comprising individuals tracked successfully across three waves, those appearing in both Waves 1 and 3, those appearing in both Waves 1 and 2, as well as individuals exclusively present in the initial survey.

Figure 1.4. Sample Persistence/Attrition across Three Waves
Statistical Weighting

Statistical weights for eligible respondents in this study were calculated through a multi-stage process to ensure the accuracy and representativeness of the collected data.

The initial step involved the computation of base sampling weights, which began with the base weights for all sampled housing units. These base weights were calculated as the inverse of the probability of selection from the NORC National Frame, which serves as the sampling frame for AmeriSpeak, or the address-based sample. Notably, the sample design and recruitment protocol for the AmeriSpeak Panel included the subsampling of initial non-respondent housing units, which were subsequently selected for in-person follow-up. The base sampling weights for this subsampled group were adjusted by the inverse of the subsampling rate.

To further refine the weights, adjustments were made to account for unknown eligibility and nonresponse among eligible housing units. These household-level nonresponse-adjusted
weights were then post-stratified to align with external counts obtained from the CPS, reflecting the number of households. Subsequently, these post-stratified household-level weights were assigned to each eligible adult within the recruited households. Moreover, an individual-level nonresponse adjustment was implemented to address nonresponding adults within recruited households.

The panel weights underwent an additional step of raking to external population totals associated with various socio-demographic characteristics, including age, gender, education, race/ethnicity, housing tenure, telephone status, and census division. These external population totals were sourced from the CPS. The resulting weights, adjusted to align with these external population totals, constituted the final panel weights.

For this study, study-specific base sampling weights were derived by combining the final panel weight with the probability of selection associated with the sampled respondents. Given that not all sampled individuals participated in the survey interview, an adjustment was applied to mitigate potential nonresponse bias associated with those who did not complete the interview. This adjustment involved a raking ratio method, aligning the nonresponse-adjusted survey weights with the U.S. adult population aged 18 and older across key socio-demographic characteristics such as age, gender, education, race/ethnicity, and census division. The resulting weights, adjusted to match the external population totals, constituted the final study weights. At the final weighting stage, extreme weights were systematically trimmed based on a criterion to minimize the mean squared error for key survey estimates. Following the trimming, the weights were once again raked to the identical population totals to ensure the survey respondent demographics closely mirrored those of the target population. This process was underpinned by the assumption that aligning respondent demographics with those of the target population would
lead to greater alignment between key survey variables and the characteristics of the target population (NORC, 2020).

In the third wave of data collection, the final weight variable provided alongside the dataset is derived as a product of three distinct weight components, each playing a crucial role in ensuring the representativeness and accuracy of the survey results. First, the AmeriSpeak® Panel Weights were developed for all panel members, meticulously accounting for various factors. These include the panel members’ probabilities of selection into the sample of panel recruits, adjustments for nonresponse during panel recruitment, and poststratification adjustments to align the recruited panel with established population benchmarks. Second, the Study Specific Base Weights were computed specifically for the study sample selected from the larger panel, considering their unique selection probabilities as per the study’s design. These base weights result from the multiplication of the AmeriSpeak® Panel Weights and the inverse of the selection probabilities linked to the sample selection process from the panel. Third, the Study Specific Final Weights are the ultimate weights developed to encompass all completed cases within the context of a specific study. These final weights serve as crucial adjustments to the base weights, effectively addressing survey nonresponse through a comprehensive weighting class method. Subsequently, raking adjustments are applied to the nonresponse-adjusted weights to ensure alignment between the survey sample and specific population benchmarks deemed essential for accuracy and representativeness (NORC, 2020).

In the remaining chapters, we will delve deeper into the various aspects of the pandemic’s impact and shifting attitudes. First, we will explore the changes in infection rates and vaccination trends. Second, we will examine the evolving impact of the pandemic on personal, family, and community life. Third, we will investigate the changing landscape of political trust
and attitudes. Finally, we will delve into the shifting political attitudes toward China.
Chapter 2. Changes in the COVID-19 Pandemic

Infection, Hospitalization, and Death

In response to the question in the Wave 3 survey, “Have you ever been infected with SARS-CoV-2 (including Omicron)?”, the findings revealed that 56.80% of the 2,750 respondents confirmed that they had contracted COVID-19 at some point (as shown in
 Conversely, 43.20% of respondents reported not having contracted COVID-19. When considering the frequency of infections among those who had been infected, the data indicated that out of the 1,549 individuals who reported having contracted COVID-19, the majority (67.59%) stated that they have been affected only once. A notable portion (25.63%) mentioned experiencing two bouts of COVID-19, while a smaller percentage (6.779%) reported having contracted COVID-19 three times or more. These statistics offer insights into the prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 infections among the survey participants and the distribution of the number of cases among those who have been affected by the virus. Our survey data indicate a slightly lower case rate compared to the estimated 77.5% of the American population that reported contracting the disease by the end of 2022, according to official CDC data (Vlachou, 2023).
Figure 2.1. Rates of COVID-19 in the United States, LECC-US 2023

The findings highlight significant variations in COVID-19 rates among demographic groups.
Figure 2.2 reveals that 55.53% of males and 58.34% of females reported having contracted COVID-19, with females showing a slightly higher rate. When examining responses based on race and ethnicity, significant disparities in COVID-19 rates become even more evident. Hispanic respondents reported the highest SARS-CoV-2 infection rate of 61.44%, closely followed by White Americans with an infection rate of 58.60%. Individuals from other racial or ethnic groups also had a notable infection rate of 55.20%. In contrast, African Americans reported a comparatively lower infection rate of 43.97%. Age emerged as a significant factor, with individuals aged 30-44 reporting the highest infection rate at 68%, followed closely by the 18-29 age group at 62.71%. Conversely, those aged 60 and older had the lowest infection rate at 45.51%. Educational attainment played a role in infection rates, with individuals holding post-graduate or professional degrees reporting the highest rate at 68.67%. Those with bachelor’s degrees also had a relatively high infection rate of 64.85%, while individuals with less than a high school education had a lower rate of 49.51%. Considering political affiliation, the data indicate that Republicans had the highest infection rate at 59.12%, followed by Democrats at 55.74%, and Independents at 53.76%. Finally, geographical regions displayed fairly consistent infection rates, with the Northeast at 57.25%, the Midwest at 57.55%, the South at 55.04%, and the West at 58.38%. This suggests that regional differences in infection rates were relatively minor compared to other demographic factors.

It is important to note that these disparities may not necessarily reflect the true infection rates among these groups but could be influenced by factors such as access to testing and willingness to undergo testing.
Figure 2.2. The SARS-CoV-2 Infection Rate by Social Group, LECC-US 2023

a) by gender

b) by race/ethnicity
c) by age

![Bar chart showing the percentage of people who answered "Yes" or "No" by age group.](chart)

- 18-29: 62.71% Yes, 37.29% No
- 30-44: 68.00% Yes, 32.00% No
- 45-59: 59.72% Yes, 40.28% No
- 60+: 45.51% Yes, 54.49% No

d) by education level

![Bar chart showing the percentage of people who answered "Yes" or "No" by education level.](chart)

- Less than HS: 49.51% Yes, 50.49% No
- HS graduate or equivalent: 50.33% Yes, 49.67% No
- Some college/Associate's degree: 56.28% Yes, 43.72% No
- Bachelor's degree: 64.85% Yes, 35.15% No
- Post-grad study/professional degree: 68.67% Yes, 31.33% No
The data on the timing of first COVID-19 diagnosis among respondents follows a general pattern of increasing SARS-CoV-2 infections in the years before 2023. Infections started with a small percentage in 2019, witnessed a substantial rise in 2020, continued to increase in 2021, reached a peak in 2022, and then decreased in 2023 (as shown in Figure 2.3). This trend is
aligned with the global progression of the pandemic, with the highest number of first infections occurring during the third year of the pandemic in 2022.

**Figure 2.3. Infection Time by Social Group, LECC-US 2023**

The responses to questions regarding COVID-19 diagnoses among diverse familial and social groups unveil a multifaceted picture of the pandemic’s impact.
Figure 2.4 shows that family members living with respondents exhibited a lower SARS-CoV-2 infection rate. However, extended family members not living with respondents reported a relatively higher rate of infections, hospitalizations, and deaths, suggesting a broader sphere of influence. Among friends and co-workers living outside the neighborhood, the highest infection rate was recorded, accompanied by noteworthy hospitalization and mortality rates, underlining the pandemic’s pervasive reach.
The Impact of Vaccination

After taking office in January 2021, Biden signed an executive order to increase production and distribution of vaccines (The White House, 2021). Since then, the number of COVID-19 vaccine doses administered has increased significantly. By May in 2023, 270,227,181 individuals or 81% of the population had received at least one dose of vaccine (as shown in Figure 2.4. Percentage of Known Individuals Infected, Hospitalized or Dead, LECC-US 2023).
Figure 2.5). Overall, 230,637,348 people or 70% of the population are considered fully vaccinated (USA Facts, 2023).
Among our sample, approximately 80% of participants had received at least one shot. A smaller percentage, specifically 5.62%, had received only the first shot, indicating that they are in the early stages of their vaccination process. A substantial 25.52% had received the second shot. Notably, the largest segment of the population, constituting 46.79% of the total sample, had received a third shot or more, highlighting a strong commitment to vaccination. These statistics reflect the diverse vaccination statuses within the group, with a clear majority having received multiple vaccinations.

The data on COVID-19 vaccinations and booster shots among respondents reveals variations across different demographic groups (see
Among racial and ethnic groups, White Americans had the highest rate of receiving three or more shots (47.41%), followed by African Americans (46.44%), other race/ethnic groups (45.99%), and Hispanics (44.97%). Age also played a significant role in vaccination rates. The data show a trend of increasing vaccination and booster rates with age. The 60+ age group had the highest percentage of individuals receiving three or more shots (62.11%), followed by the 45-59 age group (40.70%). In contrast, the 18-29 age group had the highest percentage of individuals receiving their first shot (8.365%), while the 30-44 age group had the highest percentage of those not yet vaccinated (29.43%).

Education level also influenced vaccination rates. Those with a post-graduate study or professional degree had the highest rate of receiving three or more shots (67.32%). Conversely, high school graduates or those with less than a high school education had the highest percentage of individuals not yet vaccinated. Political affiliation revealed notable differences in vaccination rates, with Democrat-leaning respondents having the highest percentage of individuals receiving three or more shots (63.14%), while Republican-leaning respondents had the highest percentage of those not yet vaccinated (34.14%). Geographical regions exhibited variations in vaccination rates as well. The Northeast had the highest percentage of individuals receiving three or more shots (55.82%), while the Midwest and South had higher percentages of individuals not yet vaccinated (24.84% and 24.54%, respectively).
Figure 2.6. Vaccination Rates by Social Group, LECC-US 2023

a) by race/ethnicity

b) by age
Summary

This section, focused on the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, delving into SARS-CoV-2 infection rates, vaccination trends, and demographic disparities. Notably, the data reveal that a
majority of respondents, comprising 56.80%, reported past COVID-19 infections. While a significant portion of the population remains COVID-free, this highlights the wide-ranging reach of the virus. The survey data also shed light on the frequency of infections among those who have contracted COVID-19. The majority of individuals (67.59%) reported experiencing the disease only once, while a noteworthy portion (25.63%) endured infections twice, and a smaller percentage (6.78%) suffered infections three or more times. This insight provides a nuanced perspective on the prevalence of COVID-19 and recurrence among the surveyed individuals. Demographic disparities in infection rates are evident. Females showed a slightly higher infection rate than males. In terms of race and ethnicity, Hispanic and White Americans reported the highest infection rates, followed closely by respondents from other backgrounds, while African Americans exhibited a comparatively lower infection rate. Age played a significant role, with individuals aged 30-44 having the highest infection rate, while those aged 60 and older displayed the lowest rate. Education level influenced infection rates, with post-graduate degree holders reporting the highest rate. Political affiliation showcased differences, with Republicans having the highest infection rate.

Regarding vaccination, the data indicate substantial progress. National data suggest that as of May 2023, approximately 81% of the population had received at least one vaccine dose, and 70% were fully vaccinated. In addition, our survey data highlight persistent demographic disparities in vaccination rates. White Americans exhibited the highest rate of receiving three or more vaccine shots. Age was another influential factor, as older age groups showed higher percentages of individuals receiving booster shots. Furthermore, highly educated individuals demonstrated higher rates for receiving booster shots. Notably, there were significant differences in vaccination rates based on political affiliation, with Democrats leading in vaccination rates.
In summary, this chapter provides a detailed description of the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact in the United States, highlighting disparities in infection and vaccination rates among various demographic groups. These insights emphasize the importance of targeted public health interventions to ensure equitable access to healthcare resources and promote vaccination uptake across diverse populations.
Chapter 3. The Changing Personal and Family Life

Employment and Job Loss

The survey sought to understand respondents’ perceptions of their job security for the upcoming 12 months. As shown in Figure 3.1, in the third wave, a significant majority of respondents expressed a high level of confidence in their employment security, indicating that they were “not at all likely” to lose their jobs (58.15%). This marks a notable increase compared to the prior two waves, indicating a growing sense of job security among the surveyed population over time. Approximately 33.90% of respondents opted for “not too likely,” signifying a belief that job loss or layoffs were somewhat unlikely in the coming year. This group exhibited a moderately optimistic outlook regarding their job security. Conversely, a smaller proportion of respondents expressed varying degrees of concern. About 5.83% believed that job loss was "fairly likely," and 2.12% thought it was “very likely” that they would lose their jobs in the next 12 months. Importantly, these percentages were significantly lower than those observed in the previous waves, indicating a notable decrease in the number of individuals who were concerned about job security. This shift underscores a more positive trend in the perception of job security among respondents.
We now examine the intriguing differences in individuals’ perceptions of job security across different social groups (see Figure 3.2). In Wave 3, it becomes evident that gender plays a significant role in shaping job loss expectations. Notably, male respondents tended to exhibit a higher degree of optimism regarding their job security in the upcoming year compared to their female counterparts. Specifically, 58.68% of males in Wave 3 considered it “not at all likely” that they would lose their jobs, while 57.49% of females shared a similar sentiment. This gender difference is consistent with the trend and even more pronounced in previous waves (Wave 1 and Wave 2), whereas males consistently reported a lower likelihood of job loss than females.

We also examined how race and ethnicity affected individuals’ perceptions of job security for the upcoming year. In Wave 3, Whites consistently expressed the highest level of confidence in their job security, with 63.43% of them believing that job loss was “not at all likely” for them in the near future. This pattern is aligned with the trends observed in the
previous waves (WAVE 1 and WAVE 2), in which White Americans consistently reported the highest level of job security perception, followed by African Americans, Hispanics, and Others. We also explore the relationship between age groups and individuals’ perceptions of job security in the upcoming year. The data underscores the substantial association between age and the perceptions. In WAVE 3, respondents in the 18-29 age group expressed the lowest level of confidence in their job security, while individuals in the 60+ age group exhibited the highest level of confidence, with a significant 70.03% considering job loss to be “not at all likely.” This pattern is consistent with the trends observed in the previous waves (WAVE 1 and WAVE 2), in which younger respondents consistently reported a higher likelihood of job loss compared to their older counterparts.

The data also provide valuable information about how individuals from various educational backgrounds perceive the likelihood of job loss in the near future. In WAVE 3, the survey respondents’ perceptions were significantly influenced by their educational attainment. Those with higher levels of education, including bachelor’s degrees and post-graduate or professional degrees, perceived a notably lower likelihood of job loss in the upcoming year. They typically reported that they were “not at all likely” or “not too likely” to lose their jobs. Conversely, individuals with lower levels of education, such as those with less than a high school education, were more inclined to indicate that they were “fairly likely” or “very likely” to lose their jobs. This disparity in the perception of job security underscores the impact of education on individuals’ employment prospects. Notably, this pattern is consistent over the three waves, that those with more education tended to feel more secure in their jobs, while those with less education were more likely to feel less secure.
Political affiliation also plays a notable role in shaping individuals’ perceptions of job security. The data reveal distinct patterns among Democrats, Independents, and Republicans. In Wave 3, individuals identifying as Republicans consistently expressed the highest level of confidence in their job security for the upcoming year, with 66.14% of them considering it “not at all likely” that they would lose their jobs. Independent respondents exhibited a lower level of confidence, with 52.94% believing it was "not at all likely" for them to face job loss. Democrats fell in between, with 53.29% sharing this sentiment. This trend is in line with the patterns observed in the previous waves (WAVE 1 and WAVE 2), in which Republicans consistently reported the highest level of job security perception, followed by Democrats and Independents.

**Figure 3.2. Percentage of Employees Expecting Job Loss by Social Group, LECC-US 2020, 2021, and 2023**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>W1</th>
<th>W2</th>
<th>W3</th>
<th>W1</th>
<th>W2</th>
<th>W3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>7.03%</td>
<td>3.06%</td>
<td>2.07%</td>
<td>10.35%</td>
<td>3.90%</td>
<td>2.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.62%</td>
<td>7.73%</td>
<td>5.42%</td>
<td>11.68%</td>
<td>8.36%</td>
<td>6.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>28.91%</td>
<td>35.91%</td>
<td>33.83%</td>
<td>30.49%</td>
<td>41.92%</td>
<td>33.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56.44%</td>
<td>53.30%</td>
<td>58.68%</td>
<td>47.48%</td>
<td>45.82%</td>
<td>57.49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) by gender
b) by race/ethnicity

c) by age
d) by education level

e) by political affiliation
In summary, these findings highlight the consistent difference among social groups in individuals’ outlook on their employment prospects, underscoring the importance of addressing these disparities and promoting equity in the job market.

**Job Loss of Family Members**

The data reveals significant changes over three waves (WAVE 1, WAVE 2, and WAVE 3) in terms of whether at least one family member of the surveyed respondents experienced job loss or workplace closure. The results are shown in Figure 3.3. Regarding job loss, in WAVE 1, approximately 24.35% of respondents indicated that at least one member of their household had lost his or her job. This figure decreased slightly to 21.9% in Wave 2 and experienced a more pronounced decline to 13.66% in WAVE 3. When examining workplace closures, the data show a similar trend. In WAVE 1, 23.14% of respondents reported that at least one member of his or her household had experienced a workplace closure, which decreased to 18.03% in Wave 2 and dropped further to 12.6% in WAVE 3.

**Figure 3.3. Percentage of Job Loss of Family Members by Wave, LECC-US 2020, 2021 and 2023**
Work Income

The data regarding respondents’ income for the year 2022 provides valuable insights into the financial landscape among the survey participants. On average, the respondents reported earning approximately $55,415.08 in 2022, before accounting for taxes and deductions (as shown in Figure 3.4). This figure represents a noticeable increase compared to their reported incomes in the preceding years, with mean earnings of $46,675.68 in 2019 and $45,790.74 in 2020. It is important to note that these income figures are subject to some degree of variation. These standard deviations signify the extent of dispersion or variability in the reported income data for each year. In 2022, the standard deviation is approximately $42,452.15, suggesting a relatively wide range of income levels among the respondents. Overall, the data reveal that, on average, respondents experienced an increase in their income from 2019 to 2022, although there is considerable variability in individual income levels within the surveyed population. This information provides a snapshot of the financial circumstances of the respondents and can be
valuable for understanding income trends and disparities during the pandemic.

Figure 3.4. Work Income by Wave, LECC-US 2020, 2021, and 2023

The figure depicts the change in personal income among various social groups in LECC-US for the years 2019, 2020, and 2022 prior to each wave of the survey. It is evident that personal income has experienced growth across all groups during this timeframe. Notably, in 2022, individuals classified as Other racial and ethnic groups consistently reported the highest personal income, followed by Whites, Hispanics, and African Americans. This stands in contrast to the income distribution observed in 2019 and 2020 when Whites had the highest income levels. The 45-59 age group consistently reported the highest personal income, followed by the 30-44 age group, the 60+ group, and the 18-29 age group. This income distribution trend has remained stable over the years. Income increased with education levels; individuals with postgraduate study and professional degrees consistently earned the highest personal income. In 2022, individuals identified as Republicans had the highest personal income, followed by Democrats and Independents. This pattern of income distribution has remained consistent across the waves.
Figure 3.5. Work Income by Social Group, LECC-US 2023

a) by race/ethnicity

- White
  - income in 2019: 48,779
  - income in 2020: 47,650
  - income in 2022: 57,001

- Black
  - income in 2019: 42,779
  - income in 2020: 42,243
  - income in 2022: 51,773

- Hispanic
  - income in 2019: 43,327
  - income in 2020: 42,671
  - income in 2022: 50,899

- Others
  - income in 2019: 45,555
  - income in 2020: 45,452
  - income in 2022: 64,927

b) by age

- 18-29
  - income in 2019: 31,678
  - income in 2020: 48,147
  - income in 2022: 48,914

- 30-44
  - income in 2019: 43,098
  - income in 2020: 56,634
  - income in 2022: 54,770

- 45-59
  - income in 2019: 44,279
  - income in 2020: 53,728
  - income in 2022: 64,927

- 60+
  - income in 2019: 39,257
  - income in 2020: 47,741
  - income in 2022: 64,927
Work Patterns

Across the three waves, there was a noticeable fluctuation in the proportion of individuals who reported working from home. As shown in Figure 3.6, approximately 17.61% of respondents
indicated that they were engaged in remote work in WAVE 1. This percentage slightly increased to 18.81% in WAVE 2. However, by WAVE 3, there was only a slight decline in the proportion of individuals working from home, with 17.69% still reporting remote work. These variations over time suggest a dynamic shift in work arrangements and remote work prevalence throughout the study period, reflecting the evolving nature of employment during the pandemic.

Figure 3.6. Percentage of Respondents Working at Home by Wave, LECC-US 2020, 2021, and 2023

Figure 3.8 depicts the results for percentages of respondents engaged in remote work across social groups. African Americans and Others demonstrated higher remote work rates, with African Americans at 22.43% and Others at 23.19%. In contrast, Whites had a lower remote work rate at 15.86%, while Hispanic respondents fell in between with a remote work rate of 19.06%. The 30-44 age group reported the highest remote work rate at 27.18%, followed closely by the youngest age group (18-29) at 26.89%. In contrast, the 60+ age group had the lowest remote work rate at 6.34%. Education also played a substantial role in remote work trends. Respondents with higher levels of education, particularly those with bachelor’s degrees and post-
graduate or professional degrees, had notably higher remote work rates at 36.59% and 46.12%, respectively. Conversely, individuals with lower levels of education, such as those with less than a high school education or a high school diploma, reported lower remote work rates. There were variations in remote work rates based on political identification. Democrats had a higher remote work rate at 21.34%, while Republicans and Independents reported a slightly lower rate at 14.3% and 15.23%, respectively. Remote work rates also exhibited regional disparities. The West had the highest remote work rate at 19.02%, followed by the South at 18.22%. The Northeast and Midwest had a slightly lower rate at 16.78% and 16.24%, respectively. These regional differences suggest that the prevalence of remote work varied across different regions in the United States.

Figure 3.7. Percentage of Working at Home by Social Group, LECC-US 2023

![Percentage of Working at Home by Social Group](image)
a) by race/ethnicity
b) by age

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>73.11%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>72.82%</td>
<td>27.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-59</td>
<td>78.75%</td>
<td>21.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>93.66%</td>
<td>6.34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c) by education level

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than HS</td>
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<td>HS graduate or equivalent</td>
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<td>86.18%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree</td>
<td>63.41%</td>
<td>36.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-grad study/professional degree</td>
<td>53.88%</td>
<td>46.12%</td>
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</table>
Work Patterns of Family Members

The data present information regarding whether at least one member of the surveyed households worked from home during the three different waves of the survey. Figure 3.8 shows that the percentage of households with at least one member working from home was 31.7% in WAVE 1, which slightly increased to 32.25% in Wave 2 before decreasing to 29.49% in WAVE 3. This
indicates some fluctuation in the prevalence of remote work among the surveyed households over time.

**Figure 3.8. Percentage of at Least One Family Member Working at Home by Wave, LECC-US 2020, 2021, and 2023**

![Bar chart showing percentage of at least one family member working at home by wave, LECC-US 2020, 2021, and 2023.](image)

African Americans and Hispanics demonstrated higher remote work rates at 33.64% and 31.43%, respectively, compared to Whites at 27.23%. Those from other ethnic backgrounds had the highest rate at 40.58%. The youngest age group (18-29) and the 30-44 age group displayed the highest remote work rates at 40.53% and 41.22%, respectively, indicating a strong presence of remote work among younger individuals. In contrast, the 60+ age group had the lowest remote work rate at 15.00%. Respondents with higher levels of education, particularly those with bachelor’s degrees and post-graduate or professional degrees, reported notably higher rates of remote work at 50% and 60.47%, respectively. In contrast, individuals with lower levels of education, such as those with less than a high school education or a high school diploma, reported lower remote work rates. Democrats had a higher remote work rate at 32.91%, while Republicans reported a lower rate at 26.34%. Independents fell in between with a rate of 27.41%. Geographically, remote work rates varied across regions. The West had the highest remote work
rate at 32.03%, followed by the Northeast at 29.08% and the South at 29.05%. The Midwest had a slightly lower rate at 28.01%.

**Figure 3.9. Frequency of Working at Home by Social Group, LECC-US 2023**

(a) by race/ethnicity

(b) by age
c) by education level

- Less than HS: 17.70% Yes, 82.30% No
- HS graduate or equivalent: 17.48% Yes, 82.52% No
- Some college/Associate's degree: 25.71% Yes, 74.29% No
- Bachelor's degree: 50.00% Yes, 50.00% No
- Post-grad study/professional degree: 60.47% Yes, 39.53% No

- Democrats: 67.09% Yes, 32.91% No
- Independents: 72.59% Yes, 27.41% No
- Republicans: 73.66% Yes, 26.34% No

d) by political affiliation
e) by region

Parenting Patterns

As shown in
Figure 3.10, approximately 17.47% of respondents reported that they had taught their school-age children at home because their schools were closed in WAVE 1. However, this percentage declined in subsequent waves. In WAVE 2, the proportion of parents engaged in home teaching decreased to 12.45%, and in WAVE 3, it further declined to 10.96%. These statistics revealed a gradual decrease in the proportion of parents who took on the role of teaching their children at home as the waves progressed. Despite the decline, a significant portion of parents continued to provide home-based education during the pandemic in response to the challenges posed by school closures.
Similarly, when examining the data about teaching children at home during Wave 3 of the LECC-US survey, we find notable trends and variations by age group, education, political affiliations, and regions (see Figure 3.11). Respondents of other racial and ethnic groups reported the highest rate of teaching their children at home. Hispanics and African Americans also reported high rates. In contrast, Whites had the lowest rate at 8.61%. The 30-44 age group had the highest proportion of parents teaching their children at home, with 22.08% answering “yes”. The 45-59 age group also reported a relatively high rate at 11.64%. It is important to note that these percentages are closely related to the presence of school-age children in these age groups. Respondents with less than a high school education reported the highest rate of teaching their children at home at 14.16%, while other groups demonstrated rates that were comparatively close, ranging from 9.78% to 11.52%. Respondents with an Independent political affiliation had the highest rate of teaching their children at home at 14.47%, followed by Democrats at 10.78%. Republicans had a slightly lower rate at 10.03%. The West had the highest rate of parents
teaching their children at home at 11.61%, followed closely by the Midwest at 11.51%. The South and Northeast regions had relatively lower rates at 10.82% and 9.22%, respectively.

Figure 3.11. Frequency of Teaching Children at Home by Social Group, LECC-US 2023

![Graph showing frequency of teaching children at home by social group]
c) by education level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
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<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than HS</td>
<td>14.16%</td>
<td>85.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS graduate or equivalent</td>
<td>9.88%</td>
<td>90.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college/Associate's degree</td>
<td>11.52%</td>
<td>88.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree</td>
<td>9.78%</td>
<td>90.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-grad study/professional</td>
<td>10.47%</td>
<td>89.53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

d) by political affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Affiliation</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>10.78%</td>
<td>89.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>14.47%</td>
<td>85.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>10.03%</td>
<td>89.97%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
e) by region

**Parenting Patterns of Family Members**

Regarding teaching children at home in Wave 1, 25.82% of households reported that at least one member was involved in teaching children at home (as shown in Figure 3.12). This percentage decreased to 19.92% in Wave 2 and further declined to 15.93% in Wave 3. These findings suggest a decrease in the proportion of households engaged in homeschooling or remote learning for children as the waves progressed.
COVID-19-Related Welfare or Assistance

Figure 3.13 displays the percentage of respondents who reported receiving COVID-19-related welfare or public assistance in the LECC-US 2023 survey. Out of the total 2,979 respondents, 19.94% acknowledged receiving this type of assistance, while 80.06% did not.

Figure 3.13. Receipt of COVID-19-Related Welfare or Public Assistance, LECC-US 2023
The data provide insight into the receipt of COVID-19-related welfare or public assistance among social groups. The results are presented in
Figure 3.14. When examining variations by race and ethnicity, it is evident that African Americans had the highest percentage (27.1%) of individuals receiving assistance, followed by Others (26.3%), Hispanics (23.6%), and Whites (16.9%). Age also played a significant role in receipt of COVID-19-related welfare or public assistance. Respondents aged 18-29 had the highest percentage (29.39%) of recipients, closely followed by those aged 30-44 (27.67%). In contrast, those aged 60+ had the lowest percentage of recipients (12.66%). Furthermore, level of education is associated with the receipt of assistance. Respondents with a high school education or less (25.69%) were more likely to receive assistance compared to those with higher education levels. Political affiliation is another factor to consider. Independent-leaning respondents had a higher percentage (23.59%) of recipients compared to those who identified as Democrats (23.42%) or Republicans (14.66%). Finally, when examining different geographic regions, the West had the highest percentage (25%) of recipients, followed by the Midwest (19.41%), the South (17.91%), and the Northeast (17.58%).
Figure 3.14. Receipt of COVID-19-Related Welfare or Public Assistance by Social Group, LECC-US 2023

a) by race/ethnicity

b) by age
c) by education level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than HS</td>
<td>25.69%</td>
<td>74.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS graduate or equivalent</td>
<td>18.92%</td>
<td>81.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college/Associate's degree</td>
<td>19.66%</td>
<td>80.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree</td>
<td>21.85%</td>
<td>78.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-grad study/professional</td>
<td>19.14%</td>
<td>80.86%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d) by political affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Affiliation</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>23.42%</td>
<td>76.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>23.59%</td>
<td>76.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>14.66%</td>
<td>85.34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Life Assessment: Past and Future

The responses to the question "Compared to five years ago, how would you describe your life now?" reveal interesting variations across social groups in Wave 3 (see Figure 3.15). Overall, 22.64% of respondents felt that their lives had become “worse” or “much worse,” indicating a generally negative outlook. However, a larger segment, comprising 43.15% of the surveyed respondents, reported that their lives remained “more or less the same,” and 34.2% described their lives as either “much better” or “better.”

When examining gender differences, it is evident that females tend to report lower percentages of “worse” and “much worse” responses compared to males. In terms of race and ethnicity, African Americans stand out with notably lower percentages of “worse” and “much worse” responses compared to other racial/ethnic groups. Hispanics and Whites have higher percentages reporting their lives as “worse” and “much worse.” Among age groups, individuals in the 45-59 and 60+ age groups reported higher percentages of “worse” and “much worse”
responses compared to younger age groups (18-29 and 30-44). When considering education levels, respondents with lower levels of education, particularly those with “less than high school” qualifications, consistently reported higher percentages of “worse” and “much worse” responses compared to individuals with higher education levels. In terms of political affiliation, Republicans and Independents in Wave 3 reported higher percentages of “worse” and “much worse” responses compared to Democrats, emphasizing the divergent perceptions among political groups regarding negative life changes.

**Figure 3.15. Perceptions of Life Changes Over 5 Years by Social Group, LECC-US 2023**

![Perceptions of Life Changes Over 5 Years by Social Group, LECC-US 2023](image)
b) by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Much better</td>
<td>5.32%</td>
<td>4.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>18.43%</td>
<td>16.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More or less the same</td>
<td>43.26%</td>
<td>43.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>9.55%</td>
<td>10.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much worse</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c) by race/ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Much better</td>
<td>5.43%</td>
<td>3.68%</td>
<td>4.13%</td>
<td>5.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>18.75%</td>
<td>11.72%</td>
<td>20.08%</td>
<td>13.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More or less the same</td>
<td>44.39%</td>
<td>39.77%</td>
<td>42.91%</td>
<td>37.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>22.04%</td>
<td>31.95%</td>
<td>22.44%</td>
<td>34.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much worse</td>
<td>9.40%</td>
<td>12.87%</td>
<td>10.43%</td>
<td>9.56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: Much better, Better, More or less the same, Worse, Much worse
d) by age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Much better</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>More or less the same</th>
<th>Worse</th>
<th>Much worse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>4.17%</td>
<td>12.88%</td>
<td>32.58%</td>
<td>11.74%</td>
<td>4.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>5.02%</td>
<td>13.34%</td>
<td>37.29%</td>
<td>14.94%</td>
<td>19.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-59</td>
<td>5.82%</td>
<td>22.27%</td>
<td>38.72%</td>
<td>10.48%</td>
<td>17.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>4.55%</td>
<td>19.38%</td>
<td>52.57%</td>
<td>5.83%</td>
<td>3.84%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Much better</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>More or less the same</th>
<th>Worse</th>
<th>Much worse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than HS</td>
<td>9.82%</td>
<td>17.86%</td>
<td>42.86%</td>
<td>8.93%</td>
<td>2.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS graduate or equivalent</td>
<td>7.45%</td>
<td>16.11%</td>
<td>49.09%</td>
<td>6.23%</td>
<td>9.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college/ Associate's degree</td>
<td>4.60%</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
<td>43.66%</td>
<td>9.50%</td>
<td>37.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree</td>
<td>2.24%</td>
<td>15.92%</td>
<td>34.36%</td>
<td>14.80%</td>
<td>33.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-grad study/professional degree</td>
<td>2.34%</td>
<td>9.77%</td>
<td>37.11%</td>
<td>17.58%</td>
<td>4.60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e) by education level
Summarizing the responses to the question regarding respondents’ expectations for their lives five years from now, it becomes evident that respondents differed greatly in their perspectives. Approximately 44.66% of respondents predicted that their lives will be “much better” or “better” in five years, reflecting an overall optimistic outlook for the future. The majority of respondents, accounting for 43.14%, expected their lives to remain “more or less the same” in five years, suggesting a perception of stability or minor changes in their future circumstances. However, it is noteworthy that 12.20% of respondents expressed apprehension about their future, expecting their lives to be “worse” or “much worse.” This combined category indicated that a minority of respondents had relatively pessimistic expectations.

The responses to the question regarding respondents’ estimations of their lives in five years revealed several interesting trends across social groups. When examining gender differences, a larger percentage of males expect their lives to be “worse” or “much worse” compared to females. Notable racial and ethnic disparities emerged, with Whites having the
highest percentage of responses indicating expectations that their lives would be “worse” or “much worse.” Age played a significant role in shaping expectations. Younger individuals (18-29) were more optimistic, with a lower combined percentage expecting their lives to be “worse” or “much worse.” Conversely, the 60+ age group had the highest combined percentage of individuals who anticipated that their lives would be the same or worse. Education levels also influenced these expectations. Those with lower education levels, such as those with less than high school education, had a higher combined percentage in the “worse” or “much worse” category. In contrast, those with higher education attainment, including bachelor’s and post-graduate degrees, displayed lower combined percentages in this category, indicating greater optimism among the highly educated. Finally, political affiliation showed variations in outlook. Republicans had the highest combined percentage anticipating their lives to be worse in five years.

**Figure 3.16. Expectations for Life in Five Years by Social Group, LECC-US 2023**
b) by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Much better</td>
<td>3.36%</td>
<td>2.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>11.05%</td>
<td>6.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More or less the same</td>
<td>44.93%</td>
<td>40.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>29.79%</td>
<td>30.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much worse</td>
<td>10.87%</td>
<td>18.76%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Much better</td>
<td>3.12%</td>
<td>3.01%</td>
<td>2.79%</td>
<td>2.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>11.22%</td>
<td>3.24%</td>
<td>8.17%</td>
<td>2.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More or less the same</td>
<td>49.23%</td>
<td>28.24%</td>
<td>34.64%</td>
<td>34.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>27.26%</td>
<td>37.04%</td>
<td>34.26%</td>
<td>35.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much worse</td>
<td>9.16%</td>
<td>28.47%</td>
<td>20.32%</td>
<td>20.44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c) by race/ethnicity
d) by age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Much better</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>More or less the same</th>
<th>Worse</th>
<th>Much worse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>4.83%</td>
<td>26.82%</td>
<td>42.15%</td>
<td>14.33%</td>
<td>2.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>2.63%</td>
<td>30.29%</td>
<td>38.40%</td>
<td>14.33%</td>
<td>2.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-59</td>
<td>3.25%</td>
<td>39.14%</td>
<td>34.42%</td>
<td>18.92%</td>
<td>4.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>3.40%</td>
<td>59.02%</td>
<td>18.92%</td>
<td>4.97%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e) by education level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Much better</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>More or less the same</th>
<th>Worse</th>
<th>Much worse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than HS</td>
<td>3.70%</td>
<td>46.30%</td>
<td>24.07%</td>
<td>17.42%</td>
<td>14.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS graduate or equivalent</td>
<td>3.40%</td>
<td>48.30%</td>
<td>25.62%</td>
<td>19.61%</td>
<td>13.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college/Associate's degree</td>
<td>3.20%</td>
<td>45.07%</td>
<td>28.00%</td>
<td>13.18%</td>
<td>13.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree</td>
<td>2.25%</td>
<td>32.02%</td>
<td>42.42%</td>
<td>19.61%</td>
<td>11.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-grad study/professional degree</td>
<td>1.96%</td>
<td>32.16%</td>
<td>41.96%</td>
<td>11.11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These findings demonstrate how demographic factors such as gender, race/ethnicity, age, education attainment, and political affiliation contribute to respondents’ diverse perceptions about the past and expectations for the future, reflecting the complex interplay of these variables in shaping individuals’ outlook on their future.

**Summary**

The COVID-19 pandemic brought about unprecedented challenges and transformations in individuals’ personal lives. This chapter delves into the multifaceted effects of the pandemic across several pivotal dimensions, offering a comprehensive analysis that highlights the intricate interplay of demographic factors in shaping these experiences and outlooks.

In WAVE 3, a notable shift in job security perceptions came to light. Most respondents displayed a heightened confidence in their job security, signifying a substantial increase from previous waves. However, when examining gender-based differences, it became evident that
males generally held a more optimistic view compared to females. In addition, differences were observed in job security perceptions across age groups, with older respondents expressing more confidence. Furthermore, variations in job security perceptions emerged along racial/ethnic, educational, and political lines. White Americans displayed the highest confidence, while other respondents exhibited slightly lower confidence levels. Those with higher education backgrounds and Republicans tended to have greater confidence in their job security. Over the course of the pandemic, we also witnessed a consistent decline in job loss and workplace closures within households. Initially high, the percentage of families experiencing job loss decreased notably from the early waves to Wave 3. Workplace closures followed a similar trend, reflecting a gradual recovery in employment stability among surveyed families. The analysis reveals shifting patterns in personal income among demographic groups over the years 2019, 2020, and 2022. In 2022, individuals in the Others category consistently had the highest income, followed by White, Hispanic, and African American individuals. The 45-59 age group consistently reported the highest income, followed by the 30-44 group, 60+, and 18-29. Higher levels of education correlated with higher income levels, and Republicans tended to report higher incomes compared to Democrats and Independents. These findings indicate dynamic income trends across different social groups.

Work patterns experienced discernible transformations across survey waves, mirroring the evolving dynamics of work arrangements during the pandemic. Remote work rates were higher among African American and Other respondents, younger age groups, and individuals with higher levels of education. Political affiliation and regional disparities also played a role in shaping remote work trends. Specifically, the Democrat-leaning respondents and those living in the West exhibited more pronounced increases in remote work. The prevalence of remote work
among family members displayed some fluctuations. While initially, a substantial portion of families had at least one member working from home, this trend experienced minor shifts across the waves. It suggests that families adjusted their work arrangements in response to changing circumstances.

Regarding parenting patterns, the data reveal a gradual decrease in the proportion of parents engaged in home teaching as the waves progressed. Nevertheless, a significant portion of parents continued to provide home-based education during the pandemic. Respondents from Other racial and ethnic backgrounds and those in the 30-44 age group were more likely to teach their children at home. Respondents with less than a high school education and those with an Independent political affiliation had higher rates of home-based education. Regional differences showed that the West and Midwest had higher rates of parents teaching their children at home compared to the South and Northeast. Not surprisingly, our analysis reveals a diminishing proportion of households engaged in teaching children at home. As the pandemic unfolded, fewer families reported involvement in homeschooling or remote learning. This may signify a return to traditional education settings as the primary mode of instruction.

Disparities in the receipt of COVID-19-related welfare or public assistance were evident across various social groups and demographics. Racial and ethnic backgrounds, age, education attainment, political affiliation, and geographical region played significant roles in affecting the likelihood of individuals receiving assistance. African Americans were more likely to report such assistance, as were younger age groups, those with lower education levels, and those with Independent political leanings. Geographically, the West had the highest rate of assistance recipients.
A majority of respondents described their lives as “more or less the same” compared to five years earlier. Gender differences were observed, with females reporting more positive changes in their lives compared to males. African Americans were more likely to describe their lives as “much better” or “better,” while White individuals were more likely to report their lives as “more or less the same.” Younger age groups were more optimistic about their future compared to older age groups. Those with higher education attainment had more positive perceptions of their lives. Political affiliation played a role, with Democrats being more optimistic about their lives than Republicans and Independents.

This expanded analysis provides a more detailed understanding of how various demographic factors influence individuals’ experiences during the COVID-19 pandemic across different dimensions of personal life. These insights underscore the importance of considering age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, income, and political affiliation in designing policies and interventions to address disparities and promote equitable outcomes.
Chapter 4. The Changing Mental Health and Perception of Community

Mental Health

The survey employed the following measurement tools to assess respondents’ mental well-being and social experiences. The Hopkins Symptom Checklist (HSCL-5) was employed to measure mental stress, which consists of five questions about the frequency of several emotions in the past week: 1) nervousness or shakiness inside, 2) feeling fearful, 3) feeling blue, 4) worrying too much about things, and 5) feeling hopeless about the future (Parloff et al., 1954). The survey also measures respondents’ sense of isolation by asking whether they feel very isolated or wish to talk to people more often to measure their feelings of isolation. To measure loneliness, the survey used the UCLA Loneliness Scale (Russell et al. 1980) and asked respondents four questions about the frequency of several emotions in the past week: 1) feeling in tune with people around, 2) feeling able to find companionship, 3) feeling like people don’t know me well, and 4) feeling like people are not with me.

As shown in Figure 4.1, in the third wave of the survey, respondents reported an average mental distress score of 1.547, indicating a slight decrease from previous waves. This suggests a reduction in emotional stress or discomfort over time after the end of the pandemic. However, respondents reported a decreased sense of isolation (average score of 2.479) compared to earlier waves, signaling a diminishing perception of isolation. While specific scores for the UCLA Loneliness Scale were not provided in the first wave, the third wave data showed an average loneliness score of 2.196, which represents a slight increase when compared to the second wave. These findings highlight evolving dynamics in mental well-being and social experiences, calling for further investigation to understand underlying factors and guide potential support and intervention efforts.
Figure 4.1. The Mean Levels of Mental Stress, Sense of Isolation, and Loneliness by Wave, LECC-US 2020, 2021, and 2023

a) mental distress

b) sense of isolation
Figure 4.2 presents data for mental distress, sense of isolation, and the UCLA Loneliness Scale by gender across waves. Females consistently reported higher mental distress scores than males, indicating that females tend to experience higher levels of mental distress throughout the study. Both males and females showed a decreasing trend in mental distress scores over time. The reduction may indicate an improvement in overall mental well-being. Similar to mental distress, females consistently reported higher sense of isolation scores compared to males in all three waves. Both males and females showed a decreasing trend in their sense of isolation scores, indicating that both men and women felt less isolated as the study progressed. The reduction in isolation scores suggests an improvement in the perception of social connectedness and support.

While Wave 1 data for the UCLA Loneliness Scale is missing, in Wave 2 and WAVE 3, the scores for both genders remained relatively stable between Wave 2 and WAVE 3, indicating that the level of perceived loneliness did not change substantially during this period for either males or females. In both Wave 2 and WAVE 3, females reported slightly higher scores on the UCLA Loneliness Scale compared to males, indicating that females, on average, experienced a slightly
higher level of perceived loneliness in these waves. While the difference may not be substantial, it does suggest a gender-based variation in loneliness perception during these two waves. These observations provide valuable insights into how gender influences mental distress, the sense of isolation, and loneliness over the course of the study. The higher mental distress, sense of isolation, and perceived loneliness scores among females throughout the study suggest that they may be more vulnerable to these challenges. However, the overall trend of decreasing scores in mental distress and the sense of isolation indicated a positive change in the participants’ psychological and social well-being as the pandemic faded away.

**Figure 4.2. The Mean Levels of Mental Stress, Sense of Isolation, and Loneliness by Gender, LECC-US 2020, 2021, and 2023**

![Bar chart showing mental distress scores by gender across waves W1, W2, and W3, with decreasing scores from W1 to W3 for both males and females, indicating a positive change.]

a) mental distress
Figure 4.3 shows that Hispanics consistently reported slightly elevated levels of mental distress, a sense of isolation, and feelings of loneliness. White Americans consistently reported the lowest levels in these aspects. African American and Other groups exhibited intermediate levels, with some fluctuations across waves. This pattern remained relatively unchanged across
all three waves, and the differences observed have remained relatively minor and consistent with the previous waves.

**Figure 4.3. The Mean Levels of Mental Stress, Sense of Isolation, and Loneliness by Race/Ethnicity, LECC-US 2020, 2021, and 2023**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>3.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **a) mental distress**

- **b) sense of isolation**
c) UCLA Loneliness Scale

Across age groups (18-29, 30-44, 45-59, and 60+), there was a noticeable decline in mental distress from the first two waves to the third wave (see
Figure 4.4). Notably, the youngest age group (18-29) consistently reported higher levels of mental distress than older age groups in each wave, although this gap slightly narrowed in WAVE 3. Respondents across all age groups reported decreased feelings of isolation compared to Wave 1 and WAVE 2. The youngest age group consistently reported the highest levels of isolation. The perception of loneliness showed limited variation across waves. These observations underscore the differences in mental well-being and social experiences among various age groups, with younger individuals experiencing higher levels of mental distress, isolation and loneliness.
Figure 4.4. The Mean Levels of Mental Stress, Sense of Isolation, and Loneliness by Age, LECC-US 2020, 2021, and 2023

a) mental distress

b) sense of isolation
c) UCLA Loneliness Scale
Figure 4.5 illustrates that individuals with less than a high school education reported the highest levels of severe mental distress. Respondents from all education levels report decreased feelings of isolation compared to Wave 1 and WAVE 2. This indicates a diminished sense of social isolation among individuals regardless of their level of education. The perception of loneliness in Wave 3 showed some variation across educational backgrounds. Individuals with less than a high school education reported slightly higher levels of loneliness than those with lower levels of education, which is a consistent pattern observed in all waves.
Figure 4.5. The Mean Levels of Mental Stress, Sense of Isolation, and Loneliness by Education Level, LECC-US 2020, 2021, and 2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>W1</th>
<th>W2</th>
<th>W3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than HS</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS graduate or equivalent</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college/Associate's degree</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-grad study/professional degree</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) mental distress
b) sense of isolation

c) UCLA Loneliness Scale
In WAVE 3, akin to Wave 1 and WAVE 2, individuals identifying as Republicans consistently displayed lower levels of mental distress than Democrats and Independents, as shown in
Figure 4.6. This trend persisted consistently across all three waves, with Republicans consistently reporting the least mental distress. Furthermore, there was a noticeable reduction in feelings of isolation among all political affiliations when compared to Wave 1 and WAVE 2. Republicans consistently reported the lowest levels of isolation, while Democrats and Independents reported the highest levels. This pattern remained consistent across all three waves. Moreover, Republicans when compared to Democrats and Independents consistently experienced the lowest levels of loneliness.
Figure 4.6. The Mean Levels of Mental Stress, Sense of Isolation, and Loneliness by Political Affiliation, LECC-US 2020, 2021, and 2023

a) mental distress

b) sense of isolation
Community Collective Efficacy

Community efficacy is important to understand urban life (Sampson et al., 1997; Sampson, 2006). To measure community efficacy, the survey adopted four items from the Sampson scale and asked respondents to indicate their agreement or disagreement (strongly disagree = -2, neutral = 0, strongly agree = 2) with the following statements: “people around here are willing to help their neighbors” and “people in this neighborhood can be trusted.” In addition, the survey asked respondents how likely (very unlikely = -2, neutral = 0, very likely = 2) they would do something about it if they saw “children spray-painting graffiti on a local building” or if they would try to break up “a fight in front of their house if someone was being beaten or threatened.” The first two questions measure social cohesion, whereas the latter two questions measure informal social control of the community.
Over the course of three waves of the LECC-US survey conducted from 2020 to 2023, an analysis of the mean levels of collective efficacy among respondents reveals a distinct pattern. In Wave 1, respondents exhibited a relatively high perception of collective efficacy, with a mean score of 3.767 (standard deviation = 0.710). This initial high perception was followed by a minor decline in Wave 2, where the mean collective efficacy score dropped to 3.732 (standard deviation = 0.704). However, in Wave 3, there was a notable rebound, with the mean collective efficacy score returning to its initial level of 3.767 (standard deviation = 0.782).

Similarly, the dimensions of social cohesion and trust followed a comparable trajectory. Mean scores for these aspects stood at 3.713 in Wave 1, dipped slightly to 3.684 in Wave 2, and then rose to 3.698 in Wave 3. Informal social control mirrored these patterns, with mean scores of 3.823 in Wave 1, 3.781 in Wave 2, and 3.837 in Wave 3. These consistent trends across multiple dimensions of community efficacy suggest a complex interplay of factors influencing the perceptions and behaviors of community members over the course of the survey.
By utilizing the ZIP Code to ZIP Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA) crosswalk (UDS Mapper, 2023), we have linked respondents’ ZIP Code information to various community-level characteristics, including racial composition and median household income. This approach allows us to investigate how community-level contexts influence respondents’ perceptions of community collective efficacy.

On average, as the White population percentages increased within communities, individuals residing in these communities tended to report consistently higher levels of collective efficacy, social cohesion, and informal social control across the percentiles. In contrast, the situation differed among non-White ethnic groups, where contrasting patterns emerged. Across all income percentiles, there was a consistent trend; respondents in communities with a higher median income, on average, had slightly higher mean scores for collective efficacy, social cohesion, and informal social control. Similarly, when examining poverty rates across
percentiles, the data revealed a common pattern: people in communities with higher poverty rates tended to exhibit slightly lower mean scores for community efficacy. In addition, people in communities with higher percentages of residents who had achieved at least a bachelor’s degree tended to have slightly higher mean scores for community efficacy measures. Regarding age, there was a consistent pattern in which people in communities with a higher proportion of older residents tended to have slightly lower mean scores for community collective efficacy. Lastly, when looking at population density, the data consistently showed that people in communities with higher population densities tended to have slightly lower mean scores for community efficacy.

**Figure 4.8. Mean Levels of Community Efficacy by Social Group, LECC-US 2023**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quartile</th>
<th>Collective efficacy</th>
<th>Social cohesion</th>
<th>Informal social control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First quartile</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>3.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second quartile</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>3.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third quartile</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>3.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth quartile</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>4.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth quartile (highest)</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>3.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) by percentage of Whites
b) by household income

c) by poverty rate
d) by education level (bachelor’s degree or more)

e) by age (percentage of people over 65)
Relationship with Neighbors

How has trust in neighbors evolved throughout the course of the pandemic? The measurement of trust in the first wave primarily assesses whether social and political trust has increased, decreased, or remained stable. In the second and third waves, respondents were asked to express their levels of social and political trust on a 5-point scale ranging from “very distrustful” to “very trustful.”

Figure 4.9 presents a comprehensive overview of trust in neighbors across the three waves of the LECC-US survey. In Wave 1, it is evident that the majority of respondents, specifically 82.56%, reported that their trust in neighbors remained unchanged. However, a notable portion, 9.87%, indicated an increase in trust, while 7.568% reported a decrease in trust. This initial wave involved 4,387 respondents. Moving to Wave 2, a more detailed picture of trust in neighbors emerges. A small percentage, 2.70%, identified as “very distrustful,” while 5.89% described themselves as “distrustful.” A substantial portion, 37.90%, considered themselves
neither “trustful” nor “distrustful.” On the positive side, 42.53% reported being “trustful,” and 10.99% were “very trustful.” Wave 2 involved 3,412 respondents. In Wave 3, the patterns continued. Similar to Wave 2, 2.68% described themselves as “very distrustful,” and 5.13% were “distrustful.” The proportion of respondents who felt neither “trustful” nor “distrustful” remained relatively consistent at 37.81%. Those who were “trustful” increased slightly to 42.91%, and 11.47% considered themselves “very trustful.” Wave 3 included 2,981 respondents. Importantly, in both Wave 2 and Wave 3, the majority of respondents expressed trust in their neighbors, as a substantial percentage described themselves as either “trustful” or “very trustful.” It is worth noting that in Wave 3, there was a slight increase in the proportion of respondents who considered themselves “trustful,” indicating a mild improvement in trust levels in the later period. Overall, these data offer a comprehensive view of how trust in neighbors evolved over the course of the survey and provide valuable insight into the dynamics of trust within communities during the pandemic period.

**Figure 4.9. Trust in Neighbors by Wave, LECC-US 2020, 2021, and 2023**

a) trust in neighbors, Wave 1
In Wave 3, trust levels in neighbors exhibited noteworthy variations among individuals with diverse levels of education. In Wave 3, among individuals with post-graduate study or a professional degree, trust in neighbors was the highest, with a mean score of 3.65. Following closely, those with some college experience or an associate’s degree exhibited an increased mean trust level in neighbors at 3.59. High school graduates or those with an equivalent education reported a slightly lower, yet notably improved, mean trust level of 3.52. Similarly, individuals with a bachelor’s degree displayed a competitive mean trust level in neighbors. However, respondents with less than a high school education reported the lowest mean trust level in neighbors among these education groups, with a score of 3.14.

Individuals with different political affiliations displayed varying levels of trust in neighbors. In Wave 3, trust levels in neighbors among Democrats increased to a mean score of 3.48 compared to Wave 2. Independents reported a mean trust level of 3.37 in neighbors,
showing an increase from Wave 2. Notably, Republicans continued to exhibit the highest mean trust level in neighbors during Wave 3, with a score of 3.70.

**Figure 4.10. Trust in Neighbors by Social Group, LECC-US 2021-2023**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Group</th>
<th>Wave 2</th>
<th>Wave 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than HS</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>3.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS graduate or equivalent</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college/Associate's degree</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>3.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>3.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-grad study/professional degree</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) by education level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Wave 2</th>
<th>Wave 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>3.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>3.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>3.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b) by political affiliation

Figure 4.11 highlights intriguing trends in neighborly interactions and knowledge about neighbors. When comparing Waves 1 and 3, a significant decrease was observed in the frequency of respondents’ conversations with their neighbors. Specifically, there was a notable increase in the proportions of respondents who engaged with their neighbors "less than once a week" and "once a week," while a decrease was observed in the categories of "2-3 times a week" and "almost every day." The mean frequency of chatting with neighbors decreased from 2.23 in Wave 1 to 2.12 in Wave 3. This suggests a potential decline in people’s willingness to communicate with their neighbors over time, hinting at a possible reduction in community cohesion or social interactions.

**Figure 4.11. Chatting with Neighbors by Wave, LECC-US 2020 and 2023**
Figure 4.12 shows that there was a slight decrease in neighborly interactions across all groups from Waves 1 to 3. In Wave 1, African Americans and Hispanics had higher mean scores for neighborly interactions, while in Wave 3, Whites and African Americans exhibited higher scores in this regard. When considering age groups, those in the "60+" category had the highest mean scores for neighborly interactions, followed by the "45-59" group, the "30-44" category, and finally, the "18-29" age group. Examining different education levels, individuals with a post-graduate education scored the lowest in neighborly interactions, while respondents with less than a high school education exhibited the highest levels of interaction. On the political front, Republicans had the highest mean scores for neighborly interactions, followed by Democrats and Independents.
Figure 4.12. Chatting with Neighbors by Social Group, LECC-US 2020 and 2023

a) by race/ethnicity

b) by age
Figure 4.13 depicts a decline in respondents’ knowledge about their neighbors from Wave 1 to Wave 3, marked by an increase in the categories of “no, I don’t know my neighbors’ job,” “not really, I could tell you the jobs of one or two neighbors but that is all,” and “yes and no, I could tell you the jobs of some of my neighbors.” Conversely, there was a decrease in
respondents who claimed to have a better knowledge of their neighbors, like “yes, I could tell you the job of every one of my neighbors” and “yes, I could tell you the jobs of most of my neighbors.” Overall, the average level of knowledge about neighbors’ jobs decreased from 2.70 in Wave 1 to 2.54 in Wave 3. While the decline is relatively small, it raises questions about the factors influencing community connections, possibly indicating changing social dynamics, such as increased mobility or shifts in the importance placed on community relationships.

**Figure 4.13. Knowledge of Neighbors’ Jobs by Wave, LECC-US 2020 and 2023**

- Yes, I could tell you the job of every one of my neighbors.
- Yes, I could tell you the jobs of most of my neighbors.
- Yes and no, I could tell you the jobs of some of my neighbors.
- Not really, I could tell you the jobs of 1 or 2 neighbors but that is all.
- No, I don’t know my neighbors’ jobs.
Figure 4.14 illustrates that there was a marginal decrease in knowledge about neighbors’ jobs for all racial/ethnic groups from Wave 1 to 3. In both Wave 1 and Wave 3, White individuals consistently exhibited the highest mean scores for knowledge about neighbors’ jobs, followed by Hispanic, Others, and African American individuals. When it comes to age groups, the “60+” category had the highest mean scores for knowledge about neighbors’ jobs, followed by the “45-59” group, then the “30-44” and “18-29” age groups. Examining different education levels, individuals with vocational or some college education consistently achieved the highest mean scores for knowledge about neighbors’ jobs. Respondents with less than a high school education had the lowest scores in Wave 3. In terms of political affiliation, Republicans scored the highest mean scores for knowledge about neighbors’ jobs, followed by Democrats and Independents.
Figure 4.14. Knowledge of Neighbors’ Jobs by Social Group, LECC-US 2020 and 2023

(a) by race/ethnicity

(b) by age
Summary

Mental distress levels showed a slight decrease over the waves of the survey, indicating some improvement in subjective well-being. Feelings of isolation increased over time, and the
perception of loneliness showed slight increases from wave to wave. Hispanic respondents consistently reported slightly higher levels of mental distress, while White Americans reported the highest levels of feeling isolated. Younger age groups experienced higher levels of mental distress while the older age group consistently reported higher levels of isolation and loneliness. Those with less than a high school education reported higher levels of mental distress, isolation, and loneliness. Political affiliation influenced mental health, with Republicans consistently reporting lower levels of distress, isolation, and loneliness.

The data revealed a distinct pattern in community collective efficacy over the survey waves. Initially high in Wave 1, collective efficacy experienced a minor decline in Wave 2 before rebounding to its initial level in Wave 3. These fluctuations underscored the adaptability and resilience of American communities in response to changing circumstances. An analysis of the impact of racial demographics on collective efficacy showed that people in communities with higher percentages of non-White residents tended to report slightly lower levels of collective efficacy. Conversely, communities with predominantly White populations consistently reported higher collective efficacy levels. Other factors, such as income, poverty rates, educational attainment, age, and population density, also exhibited patterns in which higher median incomes, lower poverty rates, higher educational attainment, younger age structure, and lower population densities were associated with slightly higher mean scores for community collective efficacy measures.

Trust in neighbors remained stable throughout the survey, with the majority of respondents maintaining trust in their neighbors. In Wave 3, education levels were found to influence trust in neighbors, with higher educational attainment associated with increased trust. In addition, party affiliation played a role, with Republicans exhibiting slightly higher trust in
neighbors than Democrats and Independents. Interactions with neighbors saw a decrease, shifting from more frequent to less frequent communication over time, possibly indicating evolving social dynamics and community relationships. Knowledge about neighbors’ jobs also exhibited a decline, with certain demographic groups consistently scoring higher, such as Whites and older individuals. Republicans generally reported higher knowledge than Democrats and Independents. These findings offer insights into the broader trends in trust, neighborly interactions, and knowledge about neighbors’ jobs over the course of the pandemic.
Chapter 5. The Changing Public Opinions

Attitudes toward Pandemic Control Policies

During the pandemic, how did Americans view the balance between disease prevention and control policies versus personal privacy and freedom? The survey asked respondents to choose between pandemic prevention vis-à-vis personal privacy as well as personal freedom. The two questions were: “Both pandemic prevention and personal privacy are important, but if you had to choose, which one do you think is more important?” and “Both pandemic prevention and safeguarding personal freedom are important, but if you had to choose, which would you consider more important?”

In Wave 3, the data revealed a significant shift in public opinion when individuals were asked to choose between pandemic prevention and the protection of personal privacy. As presented in
Figure 5.1, 43.96% of respondents considered pandemic prevention more important, while 56.04% leaned towards safeguarding personal privacy. This marks a noteworthy change compared to Wave 2 when a slightly larger proportion (52.39%) prioritized pandemic prevention, while 47.61% favored personal privacy protection.

Furthermore, when respondents were given a more detailed choice between “prevention and control of the pandemic” and “protection of personal freedom” in Wave 3, 43.29% opted for pandemic prevention, while a majority of 56.71% selected personal freedom protection. This represents a significant increase from Wave 2, reaffirming the shift in preferences towards valuing personal freedom over pandemic prevention.
Figure 5.1. Attitudes toward Pandemic Prevention and Control Policies by Wave, LECC-US 2021 and 2023

**a) protection of personal privacy**

When examining racial and ethnic differences, it becomes evident that in Wave 3, a higher percentage of White Americans prioritized the protection of personal privacy over pandemic prevention, while African Americans prioritized pandemic prevention (see
Figure 5.2). Hispanic and Other racial/ethnic groups fall somewhere in between these two groups. This racial disparity in preferences remains relatively stable across the two waves.

In addition, when considering levels of education, there is a noteworthy trend among respondents with post-graduate study and professional degrees who were particularly inclined to prioritize pandemic prevention in Wave 3. This preference is distinct compared to those with less than a high school education, high school graduates or equivalents, and some college/associate’s degree holders, all of whom prioritized personal privacy over pandemic prevention in Wave 3. This disparity underscores the nuanced perspectives regarding the importance of pandemic prevention and personal privacy within different educational strata.

Furthermore, when examining the influence of political affiliation on priorities, a consistent pattern emerges for Democrats who consistently prioritized pandemic prevention over safeguarding personal freedom in both Waves 2 and 3. In contrast, Republicans consistently prioritized the protection of personal freedom over pandemic prevention in both waves. Independents transitioned towards a greater emphasis on safeguarding personal freedom, similar to the preferences of Republicans. This shift suggests a possible influence of evolving political discourse or changing circumstances during the pandemic.
Figure 5.2. Attitudes toward Pandemic Prevention and Control Policies by Social Group (versus Privacy Protection), LECC-US 2021 and 2023

(a) by race/ethnicity

(b) by education level
c) by political affiliation

In the context of Wave 3, respondents’ preferences regarding the importance of pandemic prevention versus safeguarding personal freedom reveal notable patterns across various demographic factors. The results are shown in Figure 5.3.

First, racial and ethnic differences contribute to varying preferences. In Wave 3, a higher percentage of White Americans prioritized the protection of personal freedom over pandemic prevention, while African Americans prioritized pandemic prevention. Hispanic and Other respondents fall somewhere in between these two groups. This racial and ethnic disparity in preferences was consistent across Waves 2 and 3.

Second, when considering education levels, individuals with post-graduate study/professional degrees consistently prioritized the prevention and control of the pandemic in both Waves 2 and 3. Conversely, those with less than a high school education, high school graduates or equivalents, and some college/associate’s degree holders prioritized the protection of personal privacy.
of personal freedom over pandemic prevention in both waves. This discrepancy in preferences by level of education persisted across the two waves.

Finally, in terms of political affiliation, Democratic respondents consistently prioritized pandemic prevention in both Waves 2 and 3. In contrast, Republican respondents prioritized the protection of personal freedom in both waves, with Independent respondents aligning more closely with Republican in both Waves 2 and 3. This political divide in priorities remained consistent across Wave 2 and WAVE 3.

**Figure 5.3. Attitudes toward Pandemic Prevention and Control Policies by Social Group (versus Freedom Protection), LECC-US 2021 and 2023**

![Bar chart showing attitudes towards pandemic prevention and control policies by social group (versus freedom protection), LECC-US 2021 and 2023. The chart compares the percentage of respondents prioritizing prevention and control of the pandemic against those prioritizing protection of personal freedom across different racial and ethnic groups (White, Black, Hispanic, Others) in Waves 2 and 3.](chart)

a) by race/ethnicity
b) by education level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>W2</th>
<th>W3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than HS</td>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>Control of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44.87%</td>
<td>56.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS graduate or equivalent</td>
<td>52.72%</td>
<td>63.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college/Associate's degree</td>
<td>49.55%</td>
<td>58.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree</td>
<td>35.67%</td>
<td>52.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-grad study/professional</td>
<td>26.23%</td>
<td>73.77%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Affiliation</th>
<th>W2</th>
<th>W3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>Control of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21.90%</td>
<td>36.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>55.41%</td>
<td>63.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>72.37%</td>
<td>78.34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c) by political affiliation
These observations highlight the complex interplay between demographics, political affiliation, and the perceived importance of pandemic prevention versus safeguarding personal privacy and freedom, with some variations between waves but consistent overall trends.

**Trust in Federal and State (Local) Governments**

Throughout Waves 2 and 3, the data consistently highlight a notable disparity in individuals’ trust in the federal and state/local government (see Figure 5.4). In Wave 2, respondents reported a mean trust level of 2.60 in the federal government, indicating a moderate level of trust. As we moved to Wave 3, the average trust level in the federal government decreased slightly to 2.468. In contrast, trust in state government remained consistently higher than trust in the federal government. In Wave 2, respondents displayed a relatively high mean trust level of 2.873 in their local government. This elevated level of trust in the state government continued into Wave 3, where the average trust level remained stable, with a slight dip to 2.738. These findings underscore the continued distinction in trust levels, with respondents consistently expressing greater trust in their local government compared to the federal government. Noticeably, trust in both federal and state governments declined from 2021 to 2023.
Figure 5.4. Trust in Federal and Local Governments by Wave, LECC-US 2021 and 2023

Trust levels in both federal and local governments exhibited notable variations among racial groups (see...
Figure 5.5). White individuals displayed the lowest mean trust level in the federal government in both Waves 2 and 3. In contrast, individuals from other racial and ethnic categories reported similarly higher mean trust levels in the federal government. Turning to trust in local government, individuals from the Other racial/ethnic groups exhibited the highest trust levels in local government, while Hispanic respondents showed the lowest trust levels across the two waves. Overall, these findings highlight the shifting dynamics of trust in government across different racial and ethnic groups, with particular emphasis on the decrease in trust in the federal and local governments from Wave 2 to Wave 3.

In Wave 3, trust levels in the federal and local governments showed variations based on individuals’ level of education. In Wave 3, trust levels in the federal government followed this order based on educational attainment, from lowest to highest: some college/associate’s degree, high school graduate or equivalent, less than high school, bachelor’s degree, and post-graduate study/professional degree. Trust in local government tended to rise with higher levels of educational attainment, with individuals holding post-graduate degrees demonstrating the highest levels of trust in local government, while individuals with less than a high school diploma indicating the lowest level of trust.

In Wave 3, individuals with different political affiliations exhibited varying levels of trust in both federal and local government. Among Democrats, trust levels in the federal government decreased, with a mean score of 2.839 compared to 3.039 in Wave 2. Independents reported a mean trust level of 2.427 in the federal government, showing a minor decrease from Wave 2. Notably, Republicans continued to exhibit the lowest mean trust level in the federal government during Wave 3, with a score of 2.052, indicating a persistent lack of trust in the institution. Regarding trust in local government during Wave 3, Democrats reported a mean trust level of
2.884, indicating a decrease compared to Wave 2. Notably, this mean trust level was the highest among the three political groups. Meanwhile, Republicans maintained a slightly lower mean trust level in local government, with a score of 2.623. Independents reported the lowest mean trust level in local government at 2.576, displaying a slight decrease from Wave 2. These variations in trust levels suggest differences in perceptions of governmental institutions among individuals with distinct political affiliations. While Democrats tended to express higher trust in both federal and local governments during Wave 3, Republicans continued to exhibit lower trust levels in federal government. It is noteworthy that the differences in trust levels between these two political groups narrowed during this period.
Figure 5.5. Trust in Federal and Local Governments by Social Group, LECC-US 2021 and 2023

a) by race/ethnicity

b) by education level
American Nationalism

We asked Americans’ feelings about their national identity, specifically focusing on the degree of pride they felt. We observed some interesting trends. In terms of the average level of proudness in being American, we noticed a relatively consistent trend over the three waves (as shown in Figure 5,6). In Wave 1, the average proudness level was 3.277, which increased to 3.309 in Wave 2 and then decreased to 3.268 in Wave 3. This suggests that, on average, respondents maintained a moderate level of proudness in being American across these periods. When we delved into group variations, we found a more detailed perspective. In each wave, respondents had various degrees of proudness or lack thereof in being American. The majority of respondents expressed being very proud of being American in all waves, however, there was a slight decrease from 53.30% in Wave 1 to 52.17% in Wave 2 and 49.69% in Wave 3. The
percentage of respondents who reported feeling somewhat proud increased from 25.92% in Wave 1 to 31.19% in Wave 2 and further to 33.09% in Wave 3, showing a consistent upward trend. The percentage of respondents falling into the “not very proud” category decreased from 15.02% in Wave 1 to 11.99% in Wave 2, followed by a slight increase to 12.48% in Wave 3. “not proud at all” category showed some fluctuations, with 5.75% in Wave 1, decreasing to 4.64% in Wave 2, and then slightly increasing to 4.73% in Wave 3. It indicates a relatively consistent proportion of respondents who expressed a lack of pride in being American. In summary, the results reveal that there was a slight shift in the distribution of respondents across the level of nationalist sentiments over the three waves, with a notable increase in those feeling somewhat proud of being American. Despite these variations, a significant proportion of respondents consistently express high levels of proudness in their American identity.

Figure 5.6. Proud to be an American by Wave, LECC-US 2020, 2021, and 2023
In Wave 3, when examining respondents’ pride in being American by racial groups, we observed variations in their responses (see...
Figure 5.7). Among Whites, the majority, at 84.68%, expressed that they were “very proud” or “somewhat proud” of being American, indicating a high level of national pride. Next were Other minorities with 80.91%, Hispanics with 80.37%, and African Americans with 77.51%. Conversely, when looking at the “not proud at all” category, African Americans had the highest percentage at 7.89%, whereas respondents of other racial or ethnic backgrounds and Whites reported lower percentage of 3.05% and 3.75%, respectively. Overall, these findings highlight variations in the level of pride among racial groups in Wave 3. White Americans tended to express the highest levels of pride, while African Americans were more likely to indicate lower levels of proudness and a higher likelihood of not feeling proud at all.

There is also a distinction by level of education regarding national pride. The group with individuals who had a “high school diploma or equivalent” stands out as having the highest proportion of respondents expressing pride at 87.03% (including “somewhat proud” and “very proud”). This suggests that achieving a high school diploma has a significant impact on strengthening national pride, reflecting the value of basic education in fostering a sense of American identity. On the other end of the spectrum, the “post-grad study/professional degree” group reported the lowest level of pride at 69.11%. This group, despite having the highest level of educational attainment, demonstrated a relatively lower level of national pride.

The data analysis also emphasized differences in the level of national pride across political affiliations. Individuals who identified as Republicans exhibited a higher prevalence of national pride, with 93.89% expressing strong feelings of national identity. In contrast, Democrats had the lowest proportion of respondents expressing a high sense of national pride (74.61%).
Figure 5.7. Proud to be an American by Social Group, LECC-US 2023

a) by race/ethnicity
The survey results provide insight into the diverse opinions of the respondents on four key statements regarding nationality, patriotism, and international relations (see...
First, when asked whether “The world would be a better place if people from other
countries were more like Americans,” a significant portion of respondents (47.97%) expressed an
independent stance, neither agreeing nor disagreeing. This suggests a level of ambivalence or
mixed feelings among respondents regarding the idea that emulating American qualities would
improve the world. In addition, a notable 25.29% of respondents chose either “disagree” or
“strongly disagree,” indicating a substantial segment of the population actively disagrees with
the notion that the world should emulate American traits as a path to improvement. These
responses underscore the complexity of Americans’ attitudes toward their culture and the
application of their values on a global scale.

Second, regarding the statement “I would rather be a citizen of America than of any other
country in the world,” a majority (61.48%) either agreed or strongly agreed with this statement,
indicating a strong attachment to American identity among a substantial portion of the survey
participants.

Third, individuals were divided when asked whether “People should support their country
even if their country is in the wrong.” A majority (46.05%) either disagreed or strongly disagreed
with the notion of unquestioning support for one’s country, highlighting a nuanced perspective
on patriotism and moral responsibility.

Lastly, the statement “America should follow its own interests even if this leads to
conflicts with other nations” generated a more balanced response. While a significant portion
chose the independent option (38.61%), a substantial percentage (35.47%) agreed or strongly
agreed that America should prioritize its interests, potentially at the expense of international
conflicts.
In summary, the survey demonstrates a range of perspectives on these statements, reflecting the complexity of Americans’ attitudes towards national identity, patriotism, and international relations. Some respondents expressed a strong attachment to American identity, whereas others emphasized the importance of critical thinking and moral considerations in the context of national loyalty. The results highlight the diverse and nuanced nature of public opinion on these important issues.
Figure 5.8. American Nationalism by Social Group, LECC-US 2023

Summary

In this chapter, we analyze various aspects of public opinion in the United States across three survey waves.

Preferences regarding disease prevention and control versus personal privacy experienced a significant shift from Wave 2 to Wave 3, with a majority leaning towards safeguarding personal privacy. Racial and ethnic disparities persisted, as White Americans prioritized personal privacy and freedom, while African Americans favored pandemic prevention. Education influenced preferences, with post-graduate degree holders favoring pandemic prevention, and political affiliation continued to shape preferences, with Democrats prioritizing pandemic prevention and Republicans favoring personal privacy and freedom.
Trust in government showed a consistent decline, with local government consistently enjoying higher trust than the federal government. Differences in trust levels were observed among racial groups, with White Americans exhibiting lower trust in the federal government than individuals from other racial and ethnic groups. Educational attainment played a role, with post-graduate degree holders displaying the highest trust in local government. Political affiliation was a significant factor, as Democrats expressed greater trust in both federal and local governments than Republicans.

Feelings of pride in being American remained relatively stable, with a slight increase in “somewhat proud” responses in Wave 3. Notable differences existed among racial groups, with White Americans expressing higher levels of pride compared to African Americans. Post-graduate or professional degree holders reported the lowest level of national pride, and Republicans reported the highest level.

These findings underscore the intricate and diverse nature of public opinion in the United States, influenced by factors such as race, education, and political affiliation. A comprehensive understanding of these dynamics is essential for policymakers and researchers navigating the multifaceted landscape of American public opinion.
Chapter 6. The Changing Attitudes Toward China

Views of China

Favorability of China

The survey collected data regarding Americans’ perceptions of China, specifically favorability.

Across the three waves, there were notable shifts in sentiment towards China (as shown in
In the Wave 1, a significant percentage of respondents expressed “unfavorable” opinions towards China (73.17%, including “very unfavorable” and “somewhat unfavorable”), with a smaller proportion holding “favorable” opinions (26.83%, including “very favorable” and “somewhat favorable”). In Wave 2, we observed a slight decrease in “favorable” opinions (24.41%). Notably, “unfavorable” opinions increased (75.59%), indicating a shift towards more negative sentiments. In Wave 3, the decrease in “favorable” opinions towards China continued to decline (22.50%), and “unfavorable” opinions increased significantly (77.50%). The shift towards a more unfavorable perception of China in Wave 3 was evident. These shifts may be indicative of a negative change in public sentiment and attitudes towards China during and after the pandemic.
The data enable us to investigate the diverse opinions towards China among by race/ethnicity. Figure 6.2 illuminates significant variations in sentiment within these groups. A striking commonality emerges when examining the opinions across these groups: “somewhat unfavorable” views towards China were prevalent in each racial and ethnic category. This prevailing sentiment underscores a consistent pattern of moderate negativity towards China, regardless of the specific group surveyed. Notably, African Americans stood out with a more favorable outlook on China, primarily expressing “somewhat favorable” opinions. In contrast, unfavorable views, both “somewhat unfavorable” and “very unfavorable” were relatively less pronounced among this group. Hispanic respondents also leaned towards a relatively favorable perception of China, marked by a substantial proportion holding “very favorable” and “somewhat favorable” views. In the “other” racial/ethnic category, which encompasses a diverse range of backgrounds (including Asian Americans), moderate levels of favorability towards China were observed. This group exhibited a balanced mix of both favorable and unfavorable opinions. Conversely, Whites generally held more unfavorable views of China, with a higher
percentage expressing “somewhat unfavorable” and “very unfavorable” sentiments compared to favorable ones. In summary, while there were variations in favorability levels across the surveyed groups, the prevailing sentiment of “somewhat unfavorable” views towards China remained a consistent thread. African American and Hispanic respondents tended to have more favorable perspectives, while White Americans leaned towards unfavorable opinions. The “others” racial/ethnic category demonstrated a more mixed viewpoint. These findings illustrate the complexity of attitudes towards China within diverse racial and ethnic communities.

Opinions on China tend to vary based on respondents’ education. However, a common trend across all education levels is the prevalence of “somewhat unfavorable” opinions. The sentiment of “somewhat unfavorable” towards China tends to increase with respondents’ education. Among respondents with post-graduate study/professional degrees and bachelor’s degrees, the proportion of “somewhat unfavorable” opinions is the highest at 60.96% and 56.09%, respectively, suggesting that higher education levels are associated with a greater likelihood of holding “somewhat unfavorable” views towards China. “very unfavorable” opinions are most prevalent among respondents who have some college/associate’s degree, with a percentage of 27.74%. “very favorable” and “somewhat favorable” sentiments, on the other hand, are most common among those with lower education levels, particularly the group with “less than HS” group. Interestingly, as education increases, “very favorable” opinions become less common, with the lowest percentage found among respondents with post-graduate study/professional degree at 0.80%. Overall, “somewhat unfavorable” opinions are the most prevalent views towards China among all respondents, which is associated with higher education levels. Remarkably, respondents with some college or an associate’s degree expressed the highest level of negative views, with a significant 78.70% holding unfavorable views towards
China. In contrast, individuals with less than a high school education displayed the most favorable attitudes toward China.

The data regarding opinions on China across different political affiliations revealed noticeable differences. Republicans expressed the highest level of negative views, with a significant 85.16% indicating some form of unfavorable sentiment towards China. They were followed by both Democrats and Independents, who reported 72.48% and 71.66% unfavorable views, respectively. Overall, the result underscores the clear variation in opinions, with Republicans holding notably more unfavorable views than Democrats and Independents.

Figure 6.2. Favoring China by Social Group, LECC-US 2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race/Ethnicity</th>
<th>Very favorable (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat favorable (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat unfavorable (%)</th>
<th>Very unfavorable (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>29.68</td>
<td>53.86</td>
<td>15.08</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>15.75</td>
<td>47.49</td>
<td>34.61</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>19.80</td>
<td>48.16</td>
<td>30.41</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>18.66</td>
<td>53.73</td>
<td>25.37</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) by race/ethnicity
b) by education level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Very Favorable</th>
<th>Somewhat Favorable</th>
<th>Somewhat Unfavorable</th>
<th>Very Unfavorable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than HS</td>
<td>23.36%</td>
<td>45.79%</td>
<td>3.74%</td>
<td>17.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS graduate or equivalent</td>
<td>27.15%</td>
<td>49.77%</td>
<td>1.87%</td>
<td>19.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college/Associate's degree</td>
<td>27.74%</td>
<td>50.96%</td>
<td>1.40%</td>
<td>23.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree</td>
<td>18.70%</td>
<td>56.09%</td>
<td>1.70%</td>
<td>20.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-grad study/professional degree</td>
<td>1.54%</td>
<td>2.14%</td>
<td>1.45%</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c) by political affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Affiliation</th>
<th>Very Favorable</th>
<th>Somewhat Favorable</th>
<th>Somewhat Unfavorable</th>
<th>Very Unfavorable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>15.45%</td>
<td>57.03%</td>
<td>26.20%</td>
<td>13.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>18.18%</td>
<td>53.48%</td>
<td>26.00%</td>
<td>13.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>39.47%</td>
<td>45.69%</td>
<td>45.69%</td>
<td>45.69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Attention to News Related to China

The survey investigated individuals’ attention to news related to China, uncovering significant trends. The majority of respondents fell within the categories of “occasionally” (27.54%) and “sometimes” (31.26%), indicating that a significant portion of the surveyed population had a moderate level of interest in news related to China (see Figure 6.3). Smaller percentages fell into the “often” and “very often” categories.

The data revealed that the majority of respondents across all racial and ethnic groups tended to fall into the categories of “occasionally,” “sometimes,” or “often,” indicating substantial interest in China-related news. Notably, White Americans are the most engaged group, with the highest percentage reporting that they pay attention to news about China “very often” or “often.” Conversely, Hispanic and African Americans exhibit a notable percentage of individuals who claim to “never” pay attention to news related to China. This dichotomy in attention levels highlights the diversity of responses across different racial and ethnic groups.

As far as level of education is concerned, there is a notable shift. Respondents with “post-graduate study/professional degree” have the lowest percentage (8.17%) of those who “never” pay attention to China-related news, whereas those with “less than HS” (31.82%) education levels exhibit the highest percentage in this category. As education increases, a more substantial proportion of respondents fell into the categories of “sometimes” and “often,” demonstrating a heightened interest in news related to China.

When considering respondents’ political affiliations, it is interesting to note that Republicans stand out with the highest percentage in the categories of “often” and “very often,” suggesting a greater frequency of attention to China-related news. Conversely, Democrats and Independents show lower proportions in these categories. However, it is important to highlight
that the majority across all political affiliations still primarily fell into the “sometimes” and “occasionally” categories, demonstrating that news related to China remained a significant area of interest for a substantial portion of respondents, regardless of their political affiliations. Notably, among all political groups, the category “never” garners the highest percentage among Independents, indicating that a significant proportion of individuals with independent political leanings do not pay attention to news related to China.

**Figure 6.3. Attention to News Related to China by Social Group, LECC-US 2023**
c) by education level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Occasionally</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Very Often</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than HS</td>
<td>3.64%</td>
<td>10.91%</td>
<td>8.78%</td>
<td>9.89%</td>
<td>7.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS graduate or equivalent</td>
<td>29.09%</td>
<td>29.89%</td>
<td>21.68%</td>
<td>16.15%</td>
<td>20.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college/Associate's degree</td>
<td>24.55%</td>
<td>30.50%</td>
<td>32.58%</td>
<td>38.52%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree</td>
<td>31.82%</td>
<td>17.57%</td>
<td>11.34%</td>
<td>13.03%</td>
<td>26.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-grad study/professional degree</td>
<td>22.42%</td>
<td>28.66%</td>
<td>26.59%</td>
<td>31.16%</td>
<td>10.91%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d) by political affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Affiliation</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Occasionally</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Very Often</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>18.26%</td>
<td>4.64%</td>
<td>11.34%</td>
<td>29.38%</td>
<td>22.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>28.77%</td>
<td>32.22%</td>
<td></td>
<td>29.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>12.75%</td>
<td>22.42%</td>
<td>24.62%</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.04%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Beliefs in China Threat

The survey assessed respondents’ perceptions of the threat posed by China across various dimensions and revealed intriguing patterns. Respondents provided ratings on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 indicates “no threat at all”, 5 indicates “neutral”, and 10 indicates “very serious threat”. Figure 6.4 presents valuable insights into the beliefs held by various social groups concerning Americans’ perceptions of the threat posed by China. The data are depicted as mean scores on a scale of 0 to 10, with higher scores signifying a stronger belief in threat. The data revealed distinct levels of concern across different dimensions. The highest level of belief in China as a threat was indicated by an average score of 7.01, indicating strong apprehension about potential privacy implications (see
Figure 6.4). Following closely was the belief that China poses a threat to the U.S. economy, indicated by an average score of 6.91. Beliefs in China’s threat to U.S. national security, American democracy, and the American way of life all received moderate scores, reflecting varying degrees of concern within these domains. The lowest average score of 5.935 was given to China as a threat to the American way of life. In summary, these findings highlighted nuanced perceptions, with the highest levels of concern centering around privacy and the economy, while other aspects such as national security, democracy, and the American way of life garnered relatively lower levels of apprehension.

When examining these perceptions by racial and ethnic groups, Whites tended to rate China as a greater threat in all categories compared to other groups, with the highest average scores. African Americans, Hispanics, and Others, while generally rating China as less of a threat compared to Whites, still provided average scores above 5 in all categories. This suggests that even though their perceptions of China as a threat may be lower than those of White respondents, they still tend to view China as posing some level of threat across various dimensions.

Taking respondents’ level of education into account, individuals with some college/associate’s degree generally express a higher level of concern regarding China as a potential threat. Specifically, they rate China as a greater threat to the U.S. economy, Americans’ privacy, and U.S. national security than those with different education backgrounds. Conversely, respondents with high school diplomas or equivalencies tend to perceive China as a greater threat to the American way of life and American democracy. In summary, respondents with less than a high school education tend to rate China as the less threatening, while those with some college/associate’s degree tend to rate China as more threatening. These findings highlight the influence of education on perceptions of China’s threat in various domains.
Furthermore, when analyzing perceptions by political affiliation, Republicans consistently rated China as a more significant threat across various domains than Democrats and Independent respondents. This difference was particularly pronounced in the prompts “China is a threat to the American way of life” and “China is a threat to American democracy,” to which Republican respondents gave notably higher ratings.

Overall, these findings highlight variations in perceptions of China’s threat level based on factors such as race and ethnicity, education level, and political affiliation. Whites, those with some college education, and Republicans tended to view China as a greater threat across multiple dimensions, while other groups exhibited lower threat perceptions.
Figure 6.4. Beliefs in China Threat by Social Group, LECC-US 2023

(a) Overall

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belief</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Average (0-10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China is a threat to US economy.</td>
<td>6.05</td>
<td>6.18</td>
<td>6.57</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>7.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China is a threat to Americans' privacy.</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>5.41</td>
<td>5.28</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>6.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China is a threat to the American way of life.</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>5.92</td>
<td>7.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China is a threat to American democracy.</td>
<td>5.92</td>
<td>6.40</td>
<td>6.36</td>
<td>6.88</td>
<td>7.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China is a threat to US national security.</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>5.92</td>
<td>6.88</td>
<td>7.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) By race/ethnicity
China is a threat to US national security.

China is a threat to American democracy.

China is a threat to the American way of life.

China is a threat to Americans' privacy.

China is a threat to the US economy.

c) by education level

d) by political affiliation
Views of Chinese Americans

Favorability of Chinese Americans

The data also present opinions on Chinese Americans, with response options ranging from “very favorable” to “very unfavorable.” In contrast to the predominantly negative attitudes towards China, the majority of respondents expressed "somewhat favorable” views (54.32%), followed by “very favorable” (28.66%). A total of 13.75% of respondents expressed “somewhat unfavorable” opinions about Chinese Americans, and only 3.265% expressed “very unfavorable” opinions (as shown in Figure 6.5). This indicates a more positive sentiment towards Chinese Americans overall. However, responses to another question in our survey indicate that in comparison to other minority groups, including African Americans, Latino or Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, Korean Americans, Filipino Americans, Chinese Americans received the lowest rating, with a mean score of 70.20 degrees. While this score is still in the positive range, it indicates that, on average, Chinese Americans are viewed with somewhat less warmth and favorability compared to the other groups.

When analyzing opinions across various racial and ethnic groups, we notice significant disparities in attitudes towards Chinese Americans. The majority of respondents in all groups hold more favorable attitudes. Whites, in particular, exhibited the highest favorable percentage at 85.77%. In contrast, African Americans demonstrated the highest unfavorable percentage at 26.87%. These findings underscore a prevailing positive sentiment towards Chinese Americans across the surveyed groups.

Analyzing opinions by education reveals a clear pattern: respondents with higher levels of education tend to hold more favorable views of Chinese Americans. Specifically, individuals with a bachelor’s degree or more exhibited the highest percentages of “very favorable” opinions.
In contrast, respondents with lower education, especially those with less than a high school education, presented the highest proportions of unfavorable opinions.

When examining opinions across political affiliations, we can observe noteworthy differences in attitudes towards Chinese Americans. The majority of respondents across all three political affiliations held more favorable attitudes. Notably, Democrats exhibited the highest favorable percentage at 84.17%, followed by Republicans and Independents at 82.88% and 78.65%, respectively.

In summary, the data analysis revealed that opinions of Chinese Americans vary across demographic and political groups. While favorable views, particularly “somewhat favorable” views, are the prevailing sentiment overall, factors such as race, education, and political affiliation have discernible influences on these opinions.

**Figure 6.5. Favoring Chinese Americans by Social Group, LECC-US 2023**
b) by race/ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race/Ethnicity</th>
<th>Very favorable</th>
<th>Somewhat favorable</th>
<th>Somewhat unfavorable</th>
<th>Very unfavorable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>54.77%</td>
<td>31.00%</td>
<td>11.75%</td>
<td>2.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>54.96%</td>
<td>18.16%</td>
<td>21.07%</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>52.30%</td>
<td>27.62%</td>
<td>15.48%</td>
<td>4.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>53.38%</td>
<td>32.33%</td>
<td>18.16%</td>
<td>54.77%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c) by education level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Very favorable</th>
<th>Somewhat favorable</th>
<th>Somewhat unfavorable</th>
<th>Very unfavorable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than HS</td>
<td>15.84%</td>
<td>21.30%</td>
<td>28.99%</td>
<td>3.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS graduate or equivalent</td>
<td>23.76%</td>
<td>55.17%</td>
<td>56.10%</td>
<td>3.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college/ Associate's degree</td>
<td>47.52%</td>
<td>28.99%</td>
<td>51.15%</td>
<td>4.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree</td>
<td>47.52%</td>
<td>28.99%</td>
<td>51.15%</td>
<td>3.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-grad study/professional degree</td>
<td>47.52%</td>
<td>28.99%</td>
<td>51.15%</td>
<td>3.98%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Willingness to Accept Chinese Americans

The study investigated the attitudes surrounding the acceptance of Chinese Americans born in mainland China across various social contexts, including professional relationships, neighborhood living, and potential intimate relations through dating. The results are presented in Figure 6.6. Attitudes toward Chinese Americans in LECC-US 2023 reveals a consistent and positive pattern in respondents’ attitudes. Overall, respondents express a high degree of willingness to engage with Chinese Americans in various aspects of life. The overall willingness to accept, with an average percentage of 93%, signifies a generally open and accepting attitude toward Chinese Americans, highlighting a prevalent sense of inclusivity within the surveyed population. The data indicate that 96% of the respondents expressed willingness to have Chinese Americans as co-workers, reflecting a strong level of acceptance in professional settings. The lowest level of willingness was observed regarding the possibility of their children or relatives...
dating Chinese Americans, with a percentage of 90%, indicating a somewhat lower degree of openness about intimate relationships. It is discernible that, as the level of social proximity increases, from considering Chinese Americans as co-workers to potential family members through dating, the willingness to accept them gradually diminishes, although the overall acceptance remains relatively high.

Notably, when analyzing these attitudes based on race and ethnicity, Whites and Other racial/ethnic groups consistently displayed the highest levels of acceptance, with scores consistently above 0.926, indicating a strong sense of openness. African Americans and Hispanics showed slightly less favorable, yet still positive attitudes. This suggests a broad societal willingness to embrace Chinese Americans across multiple dimensions of social interaction.

As to differences by education levels, those with higher levels of education, particularly post-graduate study or professional degrees, show the highest willingness to accept Chinese Americans in various social contexts. This group exhibited the highest scores, with an average of 0.96, indicating a strong willingness to embrace Chinese Americans in different social settings.

Analyzing attitudes based on political affiliation indicated that Democrats and Independents generally exhibited a higher willingness to accept Chinese Americans than Republicans. Democrats had the highest average percentage of 93% across the five categories, indicating a more open attitude. Republican respondents had lower scores, suggesting a comparatively lower willingness to embrace Chinese Americans.

In summary, the data analysis reflected an overall positive attitude towards Chinese Americans in various social contexts, with some variations based on race, education, and political affiliation. White Americans and those with higher education levels tended to be more
accepting, while political affiliation played a role in shaping attitudes, with Democrats expressing a higher willingness than Republicans.

**Figure 6.6. Attitudes toward Chinese Americans by Social Group, LECC-US 2023**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Would you be willing to have them as co-workers?</td>
<td>92.69%</td>
<td>95.73%</td>
<td>94.39%</td>
<td>95.39%</td>
<td>95.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you be willing to have them live in your neighborhood?</td>
<td>94.80%</td>
<td>94.87%</td>
<td>95.42%</td>
<td>95.49%</td>
<td>95.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you be willing to have them live next door to you?</td>
<td>91.29%</td>
<td>94.99%</td>
<td>94.87%</td>
<td>95.64%</td>
<td>96.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you be willing to invite them to your home?</td>
<td>90.02%</td>
<td>92.04%</td>
<td>89.59%</td>
<td>93.09%</td>
<td>93.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you be willing to have your children/relatives date them?</td>
<td>94.87%</td>
<td>94.87%</td>
<td>94.87%</td>
<td>95.64%</td>
<td>96.15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average (5 items)
a) by race/ethnicity

- Average (5 items)
  - Less than HS: 83.72%
  - HS graduate or equivalent: 88.61%
  - Some college/Associate's degree: 94.00%
  - Bachelor's degree: 94.12%
  - Post-grad study/professional degree: 95.93%

- Would you be willing to have them as co-workers?
  - Less than HS: 89.01%
  - HS graduate or equivalent: 93.57%
  - Some college/Associate's degree: 96.71%
  - Bachelor's degree: 96.13%
  - Post-grad study/professional degree: 96.79%

- Would you be willing to have them live in your neighborhood?
  - Less than HS: 86.96%
  - HS graduate or equivalent: 92.58%
  - Some college/Associate's degree: 96.46%
  - Bachelor's degree: 96.76%
  - Post-grad study/professional degree: 96.80%

- Would you be willing to have them live next door to you?
  - Less than HS: 88.37%
  - HS graduate or equivalent: 91.65%
  - Some college/Associate's degree: 95.77%
  - Bachelor's degree: 96.71%
  - Post-grad study/professional degree: 95.98%

- Would you be willing to invite them to your home?
  - Less than HS: 86.16%
  - HS graduate or equivalent: 92.62%
  - Some college/Associate's degree: 92.99%
  - Bachelor's degree: 97.14%
  - Post-grad study/professional degree: 97.42%

- Would you be willing to have your children/relatives date them?
  - Less than HS: 82.50%
  - HS graduate or equivalent: 85.32%
  - Some college/Associate's degree: 90.84%
  - Bachelor's degree: 92.57%
  - Post-grad study/professional degree: 94.96%

b) by education level

- Less than HS
- HS graduate or equivalent
- Some college/Associate's degree
- Bachelor's degree
- Post-grad study/professional degree
d) by political affiliation

We employed Mokken Scale Analysis to generate a social distance scale ranging from 1 to 6 based on the items from the aforementioned questions (Hardouin et al., 2011). In this scale, higher values indicated greater social distance, implying a greater reluctance of individuals to engage with Chinese Americans. Overall, the mean social distance score was 1.192, indicating a generally low level of social distance, meaning people were open to engaging with Chinese Americans. The distribution in Figure 6.7 shows that nearly 94% scored 1, signifying a high willingness to interact. A small percentage scored 2 or 3, suggesting low social distance. Very few respondents had higher scores (4 or 5), indicating somewhat greater social distance. In summary, most respondents were open to interacting with Chinese Americans, with some showing varying degrees of social distance.

Within this context, we observed significant variations in social distance across different demographic groups. Figure 6.7 reveals distinct variations in social distance toward Chinese
Americans across different demographic groups. The impact of race is evident, as African Americans express the greatest social distance, followed by Whites, Hispanics, and individuals from Other racial backgrounds. Younger individuals, particularly those in the 18-29 age group, exhibited relatively less social distance compared to their older counterparts. As age increased, there was a gradual rise in social distance. Education level also played a significant role; those with lower education levels, specifically less than a high school diploma, expressed greater levels of social distance. However, as the level of education rose, social distance declined, with individuals holding post-graduate or professional degrees exhibiting the lowest levels of social distance. Political affiliation also influenced social distance attitudes, as Republicans reported greater levels of social distance than Democrats and Independents. These findings collectively underscore the intricate interplay of demographics in shaping social distance attitudes toward Chinese Americans.

Figure 6.7. Attitudes toward Chinese Americans (Mokken Scale Analysis), LECC-US 2023
b) by race/ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race/Ethnicity</th>
<th>18-29</th>
<th>30-44</th>
<th>45-59</th>
<th>60+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c) by age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>18-29</th>
<th>30-44</th>
<th>45-59</th>
<th>60+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Attitudes toward TikTok

TikTok is a highly popular social media app known for its short, engaging videos set to music and sound effects, enjoyed by users worldwide. However, concerns have emerged in the Western world regarding the security of user data on TikTok. Lawmakers and regulators worry about the
potential sharing of sensitive user information, such as location data, with the Chinese
government due to laws allowing data access for intelligence purposes. Misinformation concerns
have also been raised. As a response to these concerns, some Western countries considered or
implemented bans on TikTok. In the survey, we queried respondents about their TikTok usage
and their attitudes toward a potential TikTok ban.

Among the surveyed respondents, 31.39% indicated that they actively engage in using
TikTok (see Figure 6.8). In contrast, a notable majority of 68.61% respondents in the same group
declared that they did not use TikTok, implying that the platform had not gained widespread
adoption within this surveyed demographic.

The responses to the TikTok usage question unveiled distinct patterns across
demographic groups. African Americans showed the highest propensity for TikTok usage, while
White Americans had the lowest, with Hispanic and Other minorities fell in between. By level of
education, those with a bachelor’s degree were most likely to use TikTok, while individuals with
a high school diploma or equivalency or some college/associate’s degree were less inclined.
Politically, Democrats and Independents were more likely to use TikTok, while Republicans
exhibited lower usage rates.

Figure 6.8. TikTok Usage by Social Group, LECC-US Wave 2023
a) overall

b) by race/ethnicity
c) by education level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Yes Percentage</th>
<th>No Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than HS</td>
<td>33.64%</td>
<td>66.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS graduate or equivalent</td>
<td>29.01%</td>
<td>70.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college/Associate's degree</td>
<td>29.37%</td>
<td>70.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree</td>
<td>41.81%</td>
<td>58.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-grad study/professional degree</td>
<td>34.77%</td>
<td>65.23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d) by political affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Affiliation</th>
<th>Yes Percentage</th>
<th>No Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>63.20%</td>
<td>36.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>32.39%</td>
<td>67.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>24.73%</td>
<td>75.27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The data on support for potential TikTok bans indicates a diverse range of opinions within the surveyed respondents. Figure 6.9 presents that while the largest proportion remains independent on the issue (38.24%), a notable group expresses support (21.48%) or strong support (22.83%) for banning TikTok. Conversely, there are also respondents who oppose (9.06%) or strongly oppose (8.4%) the idea of banning the platform.

The responses to the question regarding support for TikTok bans imposed by the U.S. government revealed a spectrum of opinions across various demographic groups. African Americans tended to display the highest levels of opposition to the bans, with a significant percentage strongly opposing or opposing them. However, a notable proportion also fell into the neutral category. In contrast, White Americans showed a greater inclination toward support, with the highest proportion indicating “support” or “strongly support”. Hispanics and Other racial/ethnic groups occupied an intermediary position, with notable percentages in the neutral category.

By education levels, those with a bachelor’s degree displayed the highest levels of opposition to the TikTok bans, while individuals with some college/associate’s degree or postgraduate education were more supportive or strongly supportive.

Regarding political affiliation, Republican respondents distinguished themselves with a larger percentage strongly supporting the bans, indicating a stronger stance in favor of the restrictions. Democrats and Independent respondents exhibited a more evenly distributed range of opinions, with less extreme positions.

**Figure 6.9. Support for TikTok Bans by Social Group, LECC-US Wave 2023**
a) overall

b) by race/ethnicity
The chapter provides an extensive analysis of the changing impact of the pandemic on public opinion and attitudes toward China in the United States. When examining public favorability...
toward China, the results show a notable shift towards a more unfavorable perception of China during Wave 3. This shift was marked by a decline in “very favorable” opinions and a significant increase in “somewhat unfavorable” views. This suggests changing public sentiment and attitudes toward China during and after the pandemic. While variations in favorability levels existed among racial/ethnic groups, a prevailing trend of “somewhat unfavorable” views towards China remains consistent. African Americans and Hispanics tend to exhibit more favorable perspectives, while White Americans lean towards unfavorable opinions. In terms of levels of education, the data indicate a common trend of the prevalence of “somewhat unfavorable” opinions across all education groups, with individuals of higher education levels correlating with a greater likelihood of holding “somewhat unfavorable” views towards China. Republicans stood out for their notably high percentage of “very unfavorable” views compared to Democrats and Independents. Furthermore, a significant portion of the surveyed population displayed a moderate level of interest in news related to China, with White Americans being the most engaged group. When examining respondents’ perceptions of the threat posed by China across various dimensions, it highlights nuanced perceptions, with the highest levels of concern centering around issues related to privacy and the economy. White Americans, those with some college education, and Republicans tend to perceive China as a greater threat across multiple dimensions.

Shifting the focus to attitudes toward Chinese Americans, the majority of respondents express favorable views. However, these views exhibit variations based on racial and ethnic backgrounds, education levels, and political affiliations. White Americans and those with higher educational attainment tended to be more accepting of Chinese Americans. Nevertheless, political affiliation exerted its influence, with Democrats holding more favorable attitudes.
Concerning different social contexts, while professional settings tended to foster high levels of acceptance, personal relationships exhibited a lower level of willingness.

In addition to these insights, this chapter addresses TikTok-related content. It highlights distinctive usage patterns of TikTok among respondents, with variations based on racial/ethnic backgrounds, education levels, and political affiliations. African Americans showed the highest propensity for TikTok usage, whereas White Americans exhibited the lowest usage rates. Education-wise, those with a bachelor’s degree were more likely to use TikTok, and politically, Democrats were more inclined to use it compared to Republicans. When it came to support for potential TikTok bans, there was a diverse range of opinions among respondents. A notable group of respondents expressed support or strong support for banning TikTok, while others opposed or strongly opposed the idea. African Americans tended to display higher levels of opposition to bans, while White Americans showed greater support. Republican respondents leaned toward stronger support for the bans, whereas Democrats and Independents exhibited a more balanced range of opinions.

In summary, this chapter presents a comprehensive and academically rigorous overview of the evolving attitudes and opinions toward China among the American populace. It considers a myriad of demographic and contextual factors, emphasizing the intricate and multifaceted nature of public sentiment. The chapter elucidates the role of education, race, political affiliation, and information dissemination in shaping these attitudes, contributing valuable insights to the academic discourse on this subject, while also shedding light on TikTok-related usage patterns and attitudes.
Chapter 7. Conclusion and Recommendations

Summary and Conclusion

This comprehensive report presents a detailed analysis of the evolving impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and various public opinion dimensions in the United States across multiple survey waves conducted from 2020 to 2023. It provides specific insights into infection rates, vaccination trends, demographic disparities, and the multifaceted effects of the pandemic on individuals’ personal lives, family dynamics, community collective efficacy, social and political trust, and attitudes toward China and Chinese Americans, among others.

A noteworthy discovery pertains to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The data indicates that a substantial segment of the U.S. population, comprising 56.80% of respondents, reported prior COVID-19 cases. Importantly, these cases were not uniformly distributed and displayed notable demographic disparities. For example, females exhibited a slightly higher SARS-CoV-2 infection rate than males. Among ethnic groups, Hispanic and White Americans reported the highest COVID-19 rates, closely followed by respondents from other backgrounds, whereas African Americans showed a comparatively lower disease rate. Age also played a significant role, with individuals aged 30-44 experiencing the highest disease rate, while those aged 60 and older had the lowest rate. Education level had an impact on disease rates, with individuals holding post-graduate degrees reporting the highest rates of contracting COVID-19. Furthermore, political affiliation demonstrated variations, with Republicans reporting the highest disease rates. It is important to note that the number of reported cases can also be influenced by factors such as access to testing and willingness to undergo testing, which can vary among populations and regions.
According to USA Facts (2023), as of May 2023, approximately 81% of the population had received at least one vaccine dose, and 70% were fully vaccinated. Our data indicate substantial progress in vaccination. However, persistent disparities in vaccination rates were observed: White Americans exhibited the highest rate of receiving three or more vaccine shots. Age also played a significant role, as older age groups showed higher percentages of individuals receiving booster shots. Furthermore, highly educated individuals demonstrated higher rates of receiving booster shots. Notably, there were significant differences in vaccination rates based on political affiliation, with Democrats leading in vaccination rates.

In terms of personal and family dynamics, the report highlights a shift in job security perceptions, work patterns, and homeschooling. There had been a noteworthy improvement in job security perceptions over time, indicating a positive trend. However, these shifts were not uniform across all demographic groups. Males generally displayed a more optimistic outlook compared to females. Older respondents expressed greater confidence in job security, while younger generations exhibited more vulnerability. White Americans showed higher confidence levels compared to other groups. Furthermore, individuals with higher levels of education and affiliations with the Republican political party tended to harbor more positive perceptions regarding job security. Work patterns experienced noticeable transformations throughout the pandemic, mirroring the evolving dynamics of employment arrangements. Remote work became more prevalent, especially among African Americans and Other racial/ethnic groups, younger age cohorts, and individuals with advanced education. These shifts were also influenced by political affiliation, with Democratic-leaning respondents showing more pronounced increases in remote work. Homeschooling rates gradually decreased, indicating a shift back to traditional educational settings as the pandemic waned. Respondents from Other racial/ethnic backgrounds,
as well as those in the 30-44 age group, were more likely to engage in homeschooling. In addition, respondents with lower levels of education had higher rates of homeschooling.

Over the survey waves, mental distress levels, feelings of isolation, and perceptions of loneliness slightly decreased, indicating improved emotional well-being. The study analyzed mental well-being and social experiences across three waves. Females consistently reported higher mental distress and isolation than males, with decreasing trends over time. Hispanics consistently reported slightly elevated levels of mental distress, isolation, and loneliness, while White Americans reported the lowest levels. Mental distress decreased across age groups, with the youngest group consistently reporting higher distress and perceptions of isolation and loneliness. Regarding education, individuals with less than a high school education experienced the highest mental distress, isolation and loneliness. However, people from all educational backgrounds reported decreased isolation levels. Political affiliation-wise, Republicans consistently reported lower mental distress, isolation, and loneliness than Democrats and Independents. Collective efficacy initially dropped in Wave 2 but rebounded to its original level in Wave 3, reflecting communities’ adaptability. Racial demographics affected collective efficacy, with predominantly White communities reporting higher collective efficacy, while communities having higher proportions of non-White population reporting slightly lower levels. Higher median incomes, lower poverty rates, greater educational attainment, smaller proportions of older residents, and lower population densities were associated with slightly higher average scores for community efficacy measures.

Public opinion in the United States underwent significant changes during the pandemic. Trust in government experienced a consistent decline during the pandemic. Local government consistently enjoyed higher levels of trust compared to the federal government. This indicated
that Americans generally had more confidence in their local authorities when it came to pandemic management and response. Feelings of pride in being American remained relatively stable over the course of the pandemic. However, variations existed among social groups. Whites expressed higher levels of pride compared to African Americans. Significant differences in national pride by education levels were observed, with the group of individuals who had a high school diploma or its equivalent showing the highest levels of pride in being American. However, the group with the most advanced educational attainment, those with post-grad study/professional degrees, reported relatively lower levels of national pride. Furthermore, when examining political affiliations, Republicans expressed the highest levels of national pride, while Democrats demonstrated the lowest levels of national pride.

We explored the evolving public attitudes towards China, diving into transformations in perceptions, attitudes towards Chinese Americans, and the influence of information and experimental designs on public sentiments. The study revealed a distinct trend towards less favorable views of China during Wave 3, with notable variations by racial group and education level. Particularly, Republicans expressed notably high levels of very unfavorable views. Turning our attention to attitudes towards Chinese Americans, the majority of respondents held favorable views. Nevertheless, these views exhibited significant variations based on racial and ethnic backgrounds, education levels, and political affiliations. White Americans and individuals with higher educational attainment tended to express higher levels of acceptance toward Chinese Americans. However, the influence of political affiliation was evident, leading to distinct attitudes in various social contexts. Professional settings generally fostered high levels of acceptance, whereas personal relationships exhibited a lower level of willingness. Information about the Taiwan issue significantly affected attitudes, with Democrats being particularly
affected, while political and economic nationalism treatments had limited effects. Additionally, the study examined TikTok usage patterns, revealing demographic variations and diverse opinions on TikTok bans, with Republicans leaning towards stronger support. This research provides valuable insights into the intricate landscape of evolving political attitudes and the impact of information on public sentiment, as well as how demographics and political affiliations influence perspectives on emerging technologies and international relations.

In summary, this report provides a comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the intricate dynamics of social attitude in the United States. The findings have implications for policymakers, researchers, and those interested in understanding the complexities of these phenomena, emphasizing the importance of considering demographic factors in designing targeted policies to address disparities and promote equitable outcomes.

**Recommendations**

In light of the extensive analysis presented in this report, several overarching recommendations come to the forefront, underscoring the critical need for targeted policies and interventions aimed at mitigating disparities and fostering equitable outcomes.

The evolving landscape of job security perceptions and work patterns during the pandemic calls for proactive measures. First, we recommend implementing initiatives to enhance job security, particularly for vulnerable populations and those with lower levels of education. We also suggest companies embrace flexible work arrangements to accommodate the increasing prevalence of remote work. The pandemic’s impact on education and homeschooling has underscored the importance of investing in educational support and resources. For example,
policymakers should facilitate a smooth transition back to traditional school settings while supporting families engaged in homeschooling or remote learning. Additionally, local government should support parents facing unique challenges, especially those belonging to demographic groups with higher rates of homeschooling.

Community resilience and trust-building initiatives are pivotal in navigating the post-pandemic landscape. To this end, efforts that strengthen social connections and mutual support networks to foster community resilience should be promoted. Intercommunity dialogue and cooperation to bridge trust gaps should be promoted.

Public opinion dynamics shifted significantly during and after the pandemic, necessitating inclusive and transparent policy development processes. Policymakers should tailor communication and policy strategies to acknowledge demographic factors such as race, education, and political affiliation in response to shifting public opinion dynamics. Attitudes towards immigration and different ethnic groups have also evolved in complex ways. Accordingly, diversity must be considered when crafting immigration policies and initiatives aimed at promoting social cohesion. Cultural diversity can also be harnessed to foster understanding among various racial and ethnic backgrounds to build inclusive and harmonious communities. Finally, the evolving attitudes towards China and Chinese Americans underscore the need for ongoing monitoring and engagement. Community stakeholders and governments should monitor evolving attitudes towards China and Chinese Americans and try to promote cross-cultural understanding and cooperation for stronger international relations and greater social cohesion.

In conclusion, these recommendations emphasize the importance of acknowledging demographic nuances in policy formulation and intervention planning to navigate the complex
terrain of the post-pandemic American society effectively. By addressing disparities and fostering equitable outcomes, policymakers and stakeholders can collectively work towards a more resilient, inclusive, and harmonious society.
References


Appendix A: Survey Methodology

TECHNICAL OVERVIEW OF THE AMERISPEAK® PANEL

NORC’S PROBABILITY-BASED HOUSEHOLD PANEL

Updated February 8, 2023

This technical overview provides the basic information about AmeriSpeak, a large probability-based panel funded and operated by NORC at the University of Chicago. AmeriSpeak is designed to be representative of the U.S. household population, including all 50 states and the District of Columbia. U.S. households are randomly selected with a known, non-zero probability from the NORC National Frame as well as address-based sample (ABS) frames, and then recruited by mail, telephone, and by field interviewers face to face. AmeriSpeak panelists participate in NORC studies or studies conducted by NORC on behalf of governmental agencies, academic institutions, the media, and commercial organizations.

The construction of the AmeriSpeak panel started in 2014 with pilot samples. In 2015, about 7,000 households were recruited from a sample of around 60,000 addresses. In 2016, about 128,000 addresses were sampled to expand the panel to around 20,000 recruited households. About 51,000 addresses were selected for the 2017 recruitment, which led to the expansion of the regular AmeriSpeak panel to 23,000 recruited households. The AmeriSpeak panel expanded to approximately 30,000 households in 2018 and 35,000 households in 2019 through further recruitment efforts. The current panel size is 54,001 panel members aged 13 and over residing in over 43,000 households.

In addition to the regular panel for general population studies, AmeriSpeak also contains sub-panels to support studies of special populations, including AmeriSpeak Latino, AmeriSpeak Teen, and AmeriSpeak Young Adult 18-34 (which features an oversample of African Americans,
Hispanics, and Asians).

AmeriSpeak is also the probability sample source for TrueNorth®, the NORC calibration solution for combining probability and non-probability samples for estimation through small area modeling that leverages data from AmeriSpeak, the American Community Survey, CPS, and other data sources for improved statistical efficiency.² AmeriSpeak is also the sample source for the Foresight 50+ panel, which is a partnership between AARP and NORC that provides a high-quality panel for organizations looking for insights from older adults living in the United States.³

Panel Sample Frame

The primary sampling frame for AmeriSpeak is the 2010 NORC National Frame, a multistage probability sample that fully represents the U.S. household population. We provide a brief description of how the National Frame was constructed after the 2010 Census.

The primary sampling units (PSUs) in the first stage sample selection are 1,917 National Frame Areas (NFAs), each of which is an entire metropolitan area (made up of one or more counties), a county, or a group of counties with a minimum population of 10,000. A total of 126 NFAs are selected in the first stage, including 38 certainty NFAs, 60 urban NFAs, and 28 non-urban NFAs. The largest 38 NFAs, those with a population of at least 1,543,728 (0.5 percent of the 2010 Census U.S. population), were selected into the National Frame with certainty.

Within the 126 selected NFAs, the secondary sampling units (SSUs) are segments defined from Census tracts or block groups, where each segment contains at least 300 housing units according to the 2010 Census. Within the certainty NFAs, a sample of 896 segments was

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² For more information about TrueNorth, see http://amerispeak.norc.org/our-capabilities/Pages/TrueNorth.aspx.
³ For more information about Foresight 50+, see https://www.norc.org/Research/Capabilities/Pages/Foresight50.aspx.
selected using systematic PPS sampling, where the size of a segment is the number of housing units. Implicit stratification was achieved by sorting the segments by location (NFA, state, and county), principal city indicator, and by ethnic and income indicators. From each urban and rural NFA, a sample of 8 and 5 segments was selected, respectively, using systematic PPS sampling where the measure of size is the number of housing units per segment. A total of 618 segments are selected from the non-certainty NFAs.\textsuperscript{4} Overall, a stratified probability sample of 1,514 segments was selected into the National Frame in the second stage sampling.

Within the selected segments, all housing units are listed using the U.S. Postal Service Delivery Sequence File (DSF). In the 123 segments where the DSF coverage is deemed inadequate, the DSF address list is enhanced with an in-person field listing to improve coverage. The final National Frame, consisting of all listed households in the sample segments, is estimated to provide over 97 percent coverage of the U.S. household population. It contains almost 3 million households, including over 80,000 rural households that are added through the in-person listing. In addition to NORC’s National Frame, the DSF is used as a supplemental sample frame in four states. Although nationally representative, the National Frame does not include households from Alaska, Iowa, North Dakota, and Wyoming. Since 2016, the annual panel recruitment sample has included a small address-based sample from these four states to assure AmeriSpeak presence in all U.S. States and Washington, D.C.

In 2017, an enhanced DSF frame was also used to develop a new Latino Panel with adequate representation of Spanish-language-dominant Hispanics. Census tracts with a high incidence (at least 30%) of Spanish-dominant Hispanics were targeted for this recruitment. Furthermore, within these Census tracts, households that were flagged as Hispanic based on

\textsuperscript{4} A sample of 5 segments was selected from each of the 28 non-urban NFAs. However, 2 sample segments were later subsampled out in Montana due to cost.
consumer vendor data (that are typically used for direct-mail marketing) were oversampled.

Panel Sample Selection

For panel sample selection between 2014 and 2018 and in 2020, National Frame segments were stratified into six sampling strata based on the race/ethnicity and age composition of each segment, as below:

- Hispanic, high youth segments
- Hispanic, not high youth segments
- Non-Hispanic Black, high youth segments
- Non-Hispanic Black, not high youth segments
- Other, high youth segments
- Other, not high youth segments

Hispanic segments are those where Hispanics make up at least a third of the population and the Hispanic share in the population is greater than that of non-Hispanic Black. Similarly, non-Hispanic Black segments are those where non-Hispanic Black make up at least a third of the population and the non-Hispanic Black share in the population is greater than that of Hispanics. Finally, High Youth refers to segments in which 18-24-year-old adults are at least 12% of the total adult population. The above stratification is used to oversample housing units in areas with a higher concentration of young adults, Hispanics, and non-Hispanic African Americans. The resulting household sample is referred to as the initial AmeriSpeak sample or sample for initial panel recruitment.

To support the second stage of panel recruitment, initially sampled but nonresponding
housing units are subsampled for a nonresponse follow-up (NRFU). \(^5\) At this stage, consumer vendor data are matched to the pending housing units, and housing units that are flagged as having a young adult \(^6\) (18-34 years of age) or minority (Hispanic \(^7\), non-Hispanic Black \(^8\)) are oversampled for the NRFU sample. Overall, approximately one in five initially nonresponding housing units are subsampled for NRFU using the same six sampling strata defined above. Due to NRFU, these initially nonresponding housing units have a higher selection probability compared to the housing units that were recruited during the first stage of panel recruitment.

A two-phase state-based ABS sample design was used for the 2019 AmeriSpeak recruitment. NORC’s National Frame is designed to represent the U.S. household population nationally. At the state level, however, the panel may have more significant clustering effects from the use of the National Frame, especially for states with a small population. The primary objective of the 2019 design is to improve state-level representation by selecting the recruitment sample mostly from areas that are outside the National Frame. A stratified systematic sample was selected in the first phase, where each state constitutes a sampling stratum, and the sample was allocated to the strata proportional to the square root of the state population. In the second phase, young adults, Hispanic, non-Hispanic Black, and conservatives are oversampled based on commercial data sources to improve their representation in the panel. Because the 2019 design did not use NRFU face-to-face recruitment, the 2019 design did not involve geographic

\(^5\) A small fraction of initially nonresponding housing units is not eligible for NRFU, including “hard refusals” and those with an appointment for a call back from NORC.

\(^6\) A young adult flagged household refers to a household where MSG or TargetSmart indicated there was an 18-24-year-old adult in the household. In 2016 and 2017, a slightly different definition was used, and a young adult flagged household was defined as having an 18–34-year-old adult in the household by MSG or 18–30-year-old adult by TargetSmart.

\(^7\) A Hispanic flagged household refers to a household where MSG or TargetSmart indicated the presence of a Hispanic adult in the household.

\(^8\) A non-Hispanic Black-flagged household refers to a household where MSG or TargetSmart indicated the presence of a non-Hispanic Black adult in the household.
clustering.

In 2020 we returned to the “standard” sampling strategy employed in 2014 through 2018, with intentions to conduct a robust NRFU. However, the COVID-19 pandemic prevented NORC from utilizing field interviewers and the NRFU was limited to its usual first stage, a Federal Express mailing to 20% of the total sample. After an analysis of state-level representativity after 2019 recruitment, it was determined that further statewide representativity was needed in four states: WI, MO, WA, and CO. As such, statewide samples using the USPS DSF file were generated for supplemental recruitment.

In 2021, NORC also recruited into an AmeriSpeak probability sample of persons aged 50 and older using a random national consumer address file (estimated 96% sample coverage of all households in the U.S.). AmeriSpeak re-empaneled approximately 6,000 study participants in this initiative.

It was clear at the start of 2021 that NORC would not immediately be able to conduct in-person interviewing given the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. However, NORC sought to test new sampling strategies (noted below) early in 2021 in the hopes of documenting their efficacy and continuing and improving on them for the rest of 2021. In addition, it was hoped that NORC would be able to conduct in-person interviewing in the second half of 2021. As such, the 2021 recruiting sample was split into five replicates, the first of which utilized DSF sample, and was released early in the calendar year, while future replicates were sampled using the NORC National Frame and were held until mid-year for recruiting.

At the end of 2020, a major assessment of panel representativeness was conducted to inform the 2021 sampling strategy. This analysis again explored representativity by state, but as well explored a full range of demographic variables. This analysis was conducted both with the
full panelist dataset as well as by assessing “effective panelists,” a measure of the likely demographic distributions that would occur among complete cases in any typical AmeriSpeak survey. This analysis found that AmeriSpeak could benefit from additional panelists in seven groups: households earning over $200,000, household with children, Hispanics, Hispanics that specifically speak Spanish, African Americans, persons ages 18 to 24, and persons with less than a High School education. As such, the sample was stratified using NORC Big Data Classifiers (Dutwin et al, 2023), a technique utilizing available consumer and other public Big Data to make predictions on a range of household attributes during survey sampling. Households predicted to be one of these seven attributes were oversampled, while households predicted only hold persons aged 50 and older, or otherwise not predicted hold someone with one of the seven attributes, were under sampled. This sampling method was tested in the first sampling replicate, and given very positive results, was continued in all other 2021 replicates.

NORC’s strategy of “waiting it out” was effective, as the sample replicates released mid-year allowed NORC, to wait for an effective “COVID window” to conduct in-person interviewing. In short, in-person interviewing commenced after the peak of the Delta variant in 2021 and concluded with the peak of the Omicron variants. NORC was able to conduct a full NRFU in-person effort during this time.

Panel Recruitment Procedures

AmeriSpeak Panel recruitment is a two-stage process: (i) initial recruitment using USPS mailings, telephone contact, and modest incentives, and (ii) a more elaborate NRFU recruitment using FedEx mailings, enhanced incentives, and in-person visits by NORC field interviewers.

For the initial recruitment, sample households are invited to join AmeriSpeak online by
visiting the panel website AmeriSpeak.org or by calling a toll-free telephone line (inbound/outbound supported). Both English and Spanish languages are supported for online and telephone recruitment. The initial recruitment data collection protocol features the following: an over-sized pre-notification postcard, a USPS recruitment package in a 9”x12” envelope (containing a cover letter, a summary of the privacy policy, FAQs, and a study brochure), two follow-up postcards, and contact by NORC’s telephone research center for sample units with a matched telephone number.

For the second stage NRFU recruitment, a stratified random sample is selected from the non-respondents of the initial recruitment. Units sampled for NRFU are sent a new recruitment package by Federal Express with an enhanced incentive offer. Shortly thereafter, NORC field interviewers make personal, face-to-face visits to the pending cases to encourage participation. Once the households are located, the field interviewers administer the recruitment survey in-person using CAPI or else encourage the respondents to register online or by telephone.

Panel Recruitment Response Rate and Other Panel Statistics
A sample household is considered recruited or responded if at least one adult in the household joins the panel. The weighted household response rate (AAPOR RR3) is about 6% for initial recruitment and 28% for NRFU recruitment. We report two recruitment response rates: one for all the panel recruitment years (2014-2021) and one for the recruitment years with NRFU (2014-2018 and 2021). For all recruitment years, the cumulative weighted household response rate is 21.9%; for recruitment years with NRFU, and the cumulative weighted household response rate is 34.0%. For client studies requiring a panel recruitment response rate exceeding 30%, the

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9 As the 2021 NRFU is continuing to wind down, response rates noted here are estimated for 2021 sample cases.
sampling frame may be restricted to the panelists recruited in the NRFU years. The panel recruitment response rate calculation methodology is consistent with AAPOR guidelines and fully documented.\(^\text{10}\) The annual panel retention rate is about 85%.

For individual client surveys based on the AmeriSpeak Panel, the AAPOR RR3 response rate is between 10% to 20% depending on specific study parameters such as target population, survey length, time in the field, salience of subject, and the like. This response rate considers panel recruitment rate, panel retention rate, and survey participation rate.\(^\text{11}\)

Other important panel statistics with respect to the 2014-2019 and 2021 recruited households are as follows: 68% are recruited in the initial stage and 32% are recruited via NRFU; 92% of the active panelists prefer to do web or online surveys, while 8% prefer to participate in telephone surveys; 16% of the recruited households are non-Internet\(^\text{12}\); 82% are cell phone only or cell phone mostly; 17% are African- American and 18% Hispanic; and 29% have household income below $30,000 (compared to CPS benchmark of 26%).\(^\text{13}\)

Impact of Non-Response Follow-Up

NRFU is instrumental in producing the industry-leading response rate for AmeriSpeak Panel

\(^{10}\) See http://amerispeak.norc.org/research/Pages/WhitePaper_ResponseRateCalculation_AmeriSpeak_2016.pdf

\(^{11}\) A properly calculated cumulative AAPOR response rate for panel-based research considers all sources of non-response at each stage of the panel recruitment, management, and survey administration process (see https://www.aapor.org/AAPOR_Main/media/publications/Standard-Definitions20169theditionfinal.pdf, page 48-9). A common misapplication of the term “response rate” in online panel surveys is to represent the survey-specific cooperation rate as the “cumulative survey response rate.” See “Response Rate Calculation Methodology for Recruitment of a Two-Phase Probability-Based Panel: The Case of AmeriSpeak” authored by Robert Montgomery, J. Michael Dennis, N. Ganesh. The paper is available at https://amerispeak.norc.org/research/.

\(^{12}\) The non-internet households (HHs) are those that do not select “High-speed, broadband internet at home (such as cable or DSL)” or “Dial-up internet at home” response options when they are asked “What kind of internet access do you have? Please select all that apply” item in the recruitment survey. The non-internet HHs include those that only use internet on a cell connection or mobile phone.

\(^{13}\) For transparency purposes, unweighted percentages are presented in this section. Hence, these results do not consider selection probabilities. The base weighted distributions that consider selection probabilities can be provided upon request.
recruitment. Moreover, due to the more intensive effort, NRFU recruitments better represent hard-to-reach groups and are therefore more representative of the target population. For example, initial recruitment tends to under-represent young adults 18-34 years of age. NRFU recruitment corrects for this bias by bringing the age distribution of the panel closer to ACS benchmarks.

Overall, NRFU recruitment significantly improves the representation of the panel with respect to demographic segments that are under-represented among the respondents to the initial recruitment, including young adults (persons 18 to 34 years of age), African Americans, Hispanics, lower-income households, renters, cellphone-only households, and persons with lower educational attainment (e.g., no college degree). To the extent that these demographic characteristics are correlated with substantive survey variables, NRFU helps to reduce potential non-response bias in the sample estimates. NORC’s research indicates that NRFU respondents are indeed somewhat different from initial respondents for many common survey variables. For example, compared to the panelists recruited during the initial stage, NRFU panelists tend to be more conservative politically, more likely to attend church, less interested in current events or topics in the news report, less knowledgeable about science, less likely to be in favor of gun control policies, less likely to read a print newspaper (more likely to read the news online and use social media), more likely to eat at fast-food restaurants, and so on.14 These observations illustrate that NRFU recruitment is critical for achieving a more balanced panel and for making the substantive estimates in AmeriSpeak® studies more accurate. Even though NRFU panelists are more reluctant to complete surveys, the addition of NRFU panelists reduced total absolute bias on average 5 to 21 percentage points when compared to the initial stage recruits (among

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Mixed-Mode Data Collection

The AmeriSpeak® Panel supports mixed-mode data collection to improve response rate and the representativeness of the complete surveys. During the recruitment survey, AmeriSpeak® panelists are offered an opportunity to choose their preferred mode—web or phone—for future participation in AmeriSpeak® surveys. A recruited household can consist of both web- and phone-mode panelists.

Panelists predominantly prefer web over phone mode. As of February 2020, 92% of the active panelists prefer to do web or online surveys, while 8% prefer to participate in telephone surveys. The telephone mode encompasses panelists without internet access, panelists whose only internet access is via a smartphone, and panelists with internet access but are unwilling to share an email address.

To the extent that non-internet households or “net averse” persons are different from the rest of the population, mixed-mode surveys have better population coverage and produce more accurate population estimates. NORC’s telephone interviewers administer the telephone surveys using a data collection system supporting both the phone and web modes, providing an integrated sample management and data collection platform. For panelists using smartphones for web-mode surveys, the NORC survey system renders an optimized presentation of the survey questions for these mobile users.

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15 See “Nonresponse Follow-up Impact on AmeriSpeak Panel Sample Composition and Representativeness” authored by Ipek Bilgen, J. Michael Dennis, N. Ganesh. The paper is available at https://amerispeak.norc.org/research/.
Panel Management and Maintenance

Panel management and maintenance are crucial for panel health and efficiency. NORC maintains strict panel management rules to limit respondent burden, reduce panel attrition, and minimize the risk of panel fatigue. On average, AmeriSpeak® panelists are invited to participate in client studies two to three times a month. AmeriSpeak® works with NORC clients to create surveys that provide an appropriate user experience for AmeriSpeak® panelists. AmeriSpeak® will not field surveys that in our professional judgment will result in a poor user experience for our panelists. AmeriSpeak® also has a designated website and a telephone number for panelist communications.

Panel maintenance is a dynamic process because the AmeriSpeak® Panel is supplemented and refreshed regularly over time to grow the panel, compensate for panel attrition, and improve panel representation for specific subpopulations. For example, the Latino Panel and Teen Panel are created to support studies of Hispanics and teenagers, respectively; the 2019 recruitment is primarily designed to improve sample representation at the state level. As panelists are added or/and removed from the panel, the panel refreshment process takes place to ensure that the refreshed panel fully represents the corresponding target population.
Appendix B: NORC and AmeriSpeak®

As one of the world’s foremost independent research institutions, NORC at the University of Chicago delivers objective data and meaningful analysis to help decision-makers and leading organizations make informed choices and identify new opportunities. Since 1941, NORC has applied sophisticated methods and tools, innovative and cost-effective solutions, and the highest standards of scientific integrity and quality to conduct and advance research on critical issues. Today, NORC expands on this tradition by partnering with government, business, and nonprofit clients to create deep insight across a broad range of topics and to disseminate useful knowledge throughout society.

Headquartered in downtown Chicago, NORC works in over 40 countries around the world, with additional offices on the University of Chicago campus, the DC metro area, Atlanta, Boston, and San Francisco.

NORC conducted the Social Life during COVID Survey on behalf of New York University using NORC’s AmeriSpeak Panel for the sample source. This research was done to conduct a longitudinal study to measure the impact of the pandemic over time on social life in the US, with subsample analyses of seniors, families with kids, minorities, and other groups.

This AmeriSpeak Field Report supplements the information provided in the NORC Card, which provides an in-depth profile of sample quality metrics for the study, the data collection field period, interview sample size, response rate statistics, the design effect, and sampling margins of error, among other statistics. Please refer to the NORC Card for information useful for compliance with the AAPOR Transparency Initiative, in addition to information provided in this AmeriSpeak Field Report.

To learn more about AmeriSpeak or to share an RFP, please contact AmeriSpeak at
AmeriSpeak- BD@norc.org. Information about AmeriSpeak capabilities and research papers are available online at AmeriSpeak.NORC.org.